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FACEBOOKING FROM THE GREAT BEYOND:
THE PUSH TO AMEND INDIANA’S STATUTE
FOR OBTAINING ACCESS TO DIGITAL
ASSETS
I. INTRODUCTION
Among the many social media sites used today, Facebook is the leader
in the social media market with 1.55 billion users worldwide.1 Ashley, like
many other teens her age, was very active on social media, regularly
updating her status and posting pictures.2 In December of 2010, Ashley
unexpectedly died in a car accident, leaving her single mom, Barbara,
devastated. Reeling from the loss of her only child, Barbara took comfort
in accessing Ashley’s Facebook—first by reading Ashley’s old messages
and viewing pictures. Later, Barbara began removing comments from
Ashley’s profile page, updating Ashley’s status, changing her profile
pictures, and most egregiously, messaging and posting on people’s
profiles. Seemingly, Barbara assumed Ashley’s identity. Facebook
viewed Barbara’s actions as a breach of Ashley’s privacy. In response,
See Leading Social Networks Worldwide as of January 2016, Ranked by Number of Active Users,
STATISTA
(2016),
http://www.statista.com/statistics/272014/global-social-networksranked-by-number-of-users/ [https://perma.cc/JZP8-5FWF] (providing that Facebook is
the leader in social media focused on constant interaction between friends and family
through its ability to post statuses and pictures).
2
This is a hypothetical situation inspired by a news article about Becky Palmer, who died
of brain tumor at the age of nineteen. Alison Smith, Facebook Banned Me from My Dead
Daughter’s Page to Protect Her Privacy: Mother’s Anguish after Teenager Dies of Brain Tumour,
DAILY MAIL (Mar. 4, 2012), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2110019/Facebookbanned-dead-daughters-page-Mothers-anguish-locked-brain-tumour-teenagers-site-webgiant.html [https://perma.cc/7S4Z-W7JM] [hereinafter A. Smith]. Louise Palmer, Becky’s
mother, began to login to Becky’s account to gain comfort in the recent weeks after her
daughter’s death. Id. Louise would login to the account and read messages her daughter
had sent before her death, and Louise would update Becky’s profile picture. Id. Facebook
later found out, through notifications from Becky’s Facebook friends, about Louise accessing
the Facebook account, and changed the password, prohibiting access, as well as
memorializing the account. Id. Another example to consider is that of Mac Tonnies. Rob
Walker, Cyberspace When You’re Dead, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 5, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/09/magazine/09Immortality-t.html?_r=2
[https://perma.cc/UG77-NZR2]. Tonnies was an avid blogger who, on October 18, 2009,
died of a heart condition after posting his final blog posts, tweets, and private messages from
Twitter. Id. Tonnies lived most of his life online through his blog, which allowed him to
make contacts and friends virtually. Id. Tonnies left behind his parents, who did not have
any idea of or contact with his digital life. Id.
1
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Facebook changed Ashley’s login password and memorialized the
account so Barbara could no longer access it. Like many other millennials,
Ashley did not have a will in place or a plan for what would happen to
her social media accounts after her death, thus, there was no way to
determine if Ashley consented to her mother’s actions. 3 Indiana allows
personal representatives of the deceased’s estate to contact the custodian
of the social media site to petition for access to the social media account.4
For Ashley’s mother, who lived in Indiana, the statute allowed Barbara to
petition Facebook to delete or memorialize the profile.5
Currently, Indiana Code section 29-1-13-1.1 allows a third party to
intercede into the contractual relationship between the social media
Allowing access to
account holder and the social media site.6
electronically stored information under the Indiana statute ignores
contract law and allows third parties to gain access to social media
accounts of deceased users.7 The accounts are contracts between two
3
See 15 Economic Facts About Millennials, COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS (Oct. 2014),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/millennials_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9WG6-7MRJ] (defining millennials as individuals born between 1980 and
mid-2000). Millennials, who make up at least one-third of the population, are the largest
generation within the United States today. Id.
4
See IND. CODE § 29-1-13-1.1(b) (2016) (stating that an individual’s estate, so long as the
individual lived in Indiana at the time of his or her death, would be permitted to contact the
social media site to gain access to the deceased’s account).
5
See id. (reiterating that the Indiana statute to access electronically stored information
applies only to individuals who are domiciled in Indiana at the time of their death; therefore,
the personal representative of the estate of the deceased is able to contact the social media
site for access).
6
See id. (introducing the Indiana statute allowing for the personal representative to access
the electronically stored information or documents, which current legislation is defining, of
a deceased individual). The Indiana statute’s current language is:
A custodian shall provide to the personal representative of the estate of
a deceased person, who was domiciled in Indiana at the time of the
person’s death, access to or copies of any documents or information of
the deceased person stored electronically by the custodian upon receipt
by the custodian of: (1) a written request for access or copies made by
the personal representative, accompanied by a copy of the death
certificate and a certified copy of the personal representative’s letters
testamentary; or (2) an order of the court having probate jurisdiction of
the deceased person’s estate.
Id.
7
See id. (asserting that the Indiana statute allows access to a social media account without
respecting the contractual agreement between the social media site and the deceased user);
see also Natalie M. Banta, Inherit the Cloud: The Role of Private Contracts in Distributing or
Deleting Digital Assets at Death, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 799, 830 (2014) (illustrating Indiana is not
the only state that has enacted a statute of this kind; there are five other states that have
enacted statutes that allow a personal representative of a deceased’s estate to request, from
a custodian, electronically stored documents or information: Connecticut, Rhode Island,
Oklahoma, Idaho, and Delaware); Gerry W. Beyer, Florida Passes Digital Account Access Bill,
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parties, and the representative of the estate should not be permitted to
petition for access because it would be a violation of the user’s privacy and
the contractual relationship.8
To prevent access by the decedent’s estate to social media accounts,
this Note proposes an amendment to the current Indiana statute excluding
access to electronically stored information, particularly social media. 9
First, Part II establishes an understanding of social media, lists how social
media accounts create a contractual relationship, and highlights case law
to evidence this finding.10 Second, Part III examines the importance of
distinguishing how social media accounts create a contractual relationship
that terminates upon the death of the user and how this understanding
aligns with federal and state law.11 Third, Part IV introduces an
amendment to the Indiana statute and suggests the Indiana legislature
implement the proposed amendment to disallow access to a personal
WILLS, TR. & EST. PROF. BLOG (Feb. 25, 2016), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/
trusts_estates_prof/2016/02/florida-passes-digital-account-access-bill.html
[https://perma.cc/Q3FN-CY3P] (lending that Florida is taking steps to create a statute like
the current six states to allow access to deceased individual’s digital assets); Gerry W. Beyer,
Wisconsin Latest State to Consider Digital Account Access Legislation, WILLS, TR. & EST. PROF.
BLOG (Feb. 27, 2016), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/trusts_estates_prof/2016/02/
wisconsin-latest-state-to-consider-digital-account-access-legislation.html
[https://perma.cc/P234-FZU8] (finding that Wisconsin is the latest state to consider
legislation to allow access to digital assets after the user’s death).
8
See infra Part III (exploring the issues with giving the personal representative of a
deceased’s estate access under the current statute to electronically stored information or
documents in the context of contract law, probate law, and the applicable federal and state
law); see also Tracy Sears, Family Lawmakers Push for Facebook Changes Following Son’s Suicide,
WTVR (Jan. 9, 2013), http://wtvr.com/2013/01/08/legislation-introduced-for-access-todeceased-persons-digital-property/ [https://perma.cc/GBQ5-AUE2] (citing the privacy
policy that does not allow access to anyone who is not the account holder, even if it is for the
access to a deceased minor’s account).
9
See infra Part IV (introducing a proposed amendment to the Indiana statute in which
access to electronically stored information or documents would be removed from the statute
and not allowed under Indiana Code § 29-1-13-1.1).
10
See infra Part II (detailing the context of social media as a digital asset, common law
contract law, specifically adhesion contracts, and the federal and state law that govern social
media accounts and potential access to social media accounts).
11
See infra Part III (establishing that a social media account is an adhesion contract and
not personal property of the social media account holder); see also Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841
F. Supp. 2d 829, 838 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (prompting that Facebook, a social media site, is a
contract of adhesion that was formed through a combination of a click-wrap agreement and
browse-wrap agreement). Fteja was a Facebook account holder who alleged Facebook
disabled his account because of his religion and ethnicity. Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 831.
Facebook disabled Fteja’s account without his knowledge or notice. Id. The claim in Fteja is
based on a litigation clause in which the forum had been preselected in the Terms of Service
of Facebook. Id. at 833. The case discusses the way in which the contract between Facebook
and Fteja was created, what type of contract was created, as well as if the contract was valid.
Id.
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representative.12 Finally, Part V concludes that the proposed amendment
will allow social media accounts to die with the account holder,
preventing access by a third party and ensuring that the sanctity of
contracting is maintained.13
II. BACKGROUND
With seventy-four percent of adults on the Internet using social
media, social media is quickly becoming the preferred communication
method, with worldwide users reaching almost two billion in 2015. 14
Determining what should happen to social media accounts after the death
of the user is difficult because there is little, if any, legal precedent that
specifically addresses this issue.15 Additionally, discussing post-mortem
distribution plans is an uncomfortable topic to discuss, which historically
12
See infra Part IV (providing the proposed amendment to Indiana Code § 29-1-13-1.1,
which will not allow social media to be accessed by a personal representative of a deceased’s
estate).
13
See infra Part V (concluding this Note by reiterating social media is a contractual
relationship between the social media user and the social media account custodian, and there
should be a statutory amendment to prevent third party interference); see also John Conner,
Comment, Digital Life After Death: The Issue of Planning for a Person’s Digital Assets after Death,
3 EST. PLAN. & COMM. PROP. L.J. 301, 303 (2011) (establishing digital assets have befuddled
legal scholars for years as a concept and how to apply digital assets to an individual’s estate
plan when digital communication and storage has become increasingly popular and
widespread); Matthew T. McClintock, Digital Assets: Why They Need to Be Part of Your Estate
Plan, EST. PLANNING.COM (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www.estateplanning.com/Digital-AssetsWhy-They-Need-to-Be-Part-of-Your-Estate-Plan/
[https://perma.cc/T2PH-4DTF]
(highlighting when there is no definite standard for the inheritability of digital assets, social
media in particular, the accounts are at a high risk for being lost when the account owner
dies).
14
See Social Networking Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR., http://www.pewinternet.org/factsheets/social-networking-fact-sheet/ [https://perma.cc/VJ3Y-WAB4] [hereinafter Fact
Sheet] (indicating the percentages of adult users of social media, with a breakdown of users
based on gender, age, education, and salary); see also Rachel Pinch, Protecting Digital Assets
after Death: Issues to Consider in Planning for Your Digital Estate, 60 WAYNE L. REV. 545, 546
(2014) (giving the statistics of users on social media sites, such as Facebook, Twitter, and
Instagram); Percentage of U.S. Population with a Social Network Profile from 2008 to 2016,
STATISTA (2016), http://www.statista.com/statistics/273476/percentage-of-us-populationwith-a-social-network-profile/ [https://perma.cc/6WKD-XVDC] (noting that social media
usage is continuing to grow both in the United States and worldwide, with an estimated 2.5
billion users by 2018). Facebook is the leader in social networking sites used worldwide, and
it is the first social media platform to have more than one billion users. Percentage of U.S.
Population with a Social Network Profile from 2008 to 2016, supra note 14.
15
See Naomi Cahn, Postmortem Life On-line, 25 PROB. & PROP. 36, 36 (2011) (posing there is
little law on inheritability of digital assets, such as social media). Cahn made the comparison
of digital assets to copyrights because copyrights, like digital assets currently, were seen as
a question mark in determining whether they could be inherited or passed on through wills
and will substitutes. Id. at 37. However, copyrights are the property of the copyright holder
and not subject to Terms of Service or use of a social media site. Id.
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prevents Internet users from addressing estate planning issues, including
this unique aspect.16 Nevertheless, intestate and permissible estate
planning distribution for personal and real property is clear and concise
within Indiana law.17 However, it is not legally clear who, if anyone,
should inherit the rights to access the deceased user’s social media
accounts.18
Moreover, digital assets and their place in the law continue to stump
legal scholars and cause estate planners to assume incorrectly that digital
assets are a form of personal property accessed after the user’s death.19
The uncertainty has caused estate planners to incorrectly allow access to
digital assets after the user’s death.20 Allowing access to a social media
account, as if it is the personal property of the account holder, is not a
compelling reason because a social media account is created through a

16
See JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 63 (9th ed.
2013) (highlighting that a large number of the United States population does not plan for the
future of their property after their death, with this number not including the number of
people not planning for the future of their digital assets). A large number of estate planning
attorneys are now requesting information about their clients’ online life, and what digital
assets they have, if any. Cahn, supra note 15, at 36. An attorney can then advise their clients
that because many digital assets take the form of license agreements, they can be placed in a
trust. Id. at 38. Once placed in the trust, the digital asset is controlled by a trustee, who then
manages the digital assets within the trust, just like a piece of real or personal property. Id.
17
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 16, at 1 (applying the law of succession to give a
clear understanding of how property is descended from the owner to the heirs or
descendants); but see Cahn, supra note 15, at 37 (distinguishing that unlike the succession of
tangible property, like a bank account, digital asset succession under this model would
encounter issues, such as the access the personal representative is to collect).
18
See Cahn, supra note 15, at 36 (concluding that the issue of what to do with social media
accounts, along with other digital assets, has just begun to develop, and a concrete answer
has yet to be found to apply to estate planning and intestacy laws); see also Maeve Duggan,
The Demographics of Social Media Users, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 19, 2015),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/08/19/the-demographics-of-social-media-users/
[https://perma.cc/7WUQ-R92T] (providing statistics of social media usage as a whole and
for daily use of social media for all major outlets). Where seventy percent of Facebook users
log into their accounts daily, upwards of forty-three percent of people log into Facebook
multiple times a day. Duggan, supra note 18.
19
See, e.g., Conner, supra note 13, at 303 (establishing the idea that applying digital assets
to an individual’s estate plan, when digital communication and storage has become
increasingly popular and widespread, has befuddled legal scholars for years as a concept);
see also McClintock, supra note 13 (finding that ownership of digital assets is at risk when no
clear standard for inheritability exists).
20
See Conner, supra note 13, at 303 (confronting the issue that there is no set determination
of the legal standing of digital assets as personal property or a contract, and whether or not
the determination relies on the specific digital asset alone for a definition to be determined);
see also Cahn, supra note 15, at 38 (noting that a general issue that is faced is that online social
media sites can claim they have the ability to control any potential transfer of the account
through the Terms of Use or Service).
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contract.21 This Part explores social media, social media accounts as
contracts, and federal and state law that governs social media and
inheritability, or lack thereof.22 First, Part II.A studies social media as a
digital asset.23 Second, Part II.B discusses social media accounts as
contracts of adhesion, specifically as click-wrap and browse-wrap
agreements.24 Finally, Part II.C illustrates the applicable federal and state
law, which applies to a personal representative’s inability to access the
social media account after the user’s death.25
A. Social Media and Its Formation
With approximately seventy-one percent of adults on social media
using Facebook, it is the most popular form of social media.26 Individuals
use social media to create and maintain social ties and relationships with
friends and family, some of which may have not been able to be sustained
if not for social media.27 Most users check their social media accounts at
21
See infra Part II.B (determining that social media is a contract created by the user
agreeing to the terms for the particular social media site without having the ability to bargain
for the best terms for each party).
22
See infra Part II (exploring how it is determined that social media accounts should not
be allowed to be accessed by the personal representative of the deceased user’s estate because
social media accounts are contracts that should end upon the death of the user).
23
See infra Part II.A (establishing that social media is a term that is unique in its creation
through contract and that the social media outlet is distinct in its Terms of Use that create
the contract).
24
See infra Part II.B (expressing that social media is created through a contract that is
agreed to by both parties when the new user clicks “I agree” when signing up for the social
media site, and this type of agreement is a particular type of contract, an adhesion contract,
which can be broken down again into two types of agreements, click-wrap and browse-wrap
agreements).
25
See infra Part II.C (focusing on the applicable federal and state law that applies to social
media accounts as a digital asset to show that these accounts should cease upon the death of
the user).
26
See Fact Sheet, supra note 14 (drawing that Facebook is the most popular form of social
media, followed by Twitter with twenty-three percent of adults using that form of social
media); see also Percentage of U.S. Population with a Social Network Profile from 2008 to 2016,
supra note 14 (pointing out that North America currently has the highest number of social
media users in the world with fifty-nine percent).
27
See Aaron Smith, Why Americans Use Social Media, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 15, 2011),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2011/11/15/why-americans-use-social-media/
[https://perma.cc/S4PQ-H4ZP] (finding that the major force behind people becoming social
media users is the ability to keep in touch with new and old friends, friends that the user has
fallen out of touch with, and long-distance family members); see also Emily M. JanoskiHaehlen, The Courts Are All a ‘Twitter’: The Implications of Social Media Use in the Courts, 46
VAL. U. L. REV. 43, 43 (2011) (explaining that Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, and YouTube are
some of the social media sites that allow for a user to connect with others locally and around
the world). These social media sites are used to connect one individual to the rest of the
world. Janoski-Haehlen, supra note 27, at 43. Not only does the user communicate with
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least seventeen times per day, which on average means at least once every
hour of the day.28 Aside from its tremendous social utility, social media
accounts are classified as digital assets along with other online accounts,
such as Amazon accounts, online banking accounts, and email accounts. 29
Scholars define digital assets as “any file on your computer in a storage
drive or website and any online account or membership.”30 This
definition allows items such as Microsoft Word documents, digital
pictures and videos, and iTunes music to be considered a digital asset of
the individual who created or bought it. 31
Unlike the aforementioned assets, social media accounts are unique
because they have their own terms and conditions which users must
follow.32 For instance, Facebook’s Terms of Service explicitly state that the

loved ones near and far, but also people they have never met before the use of social media.
Id.
28
See Lulu Chang, Americans Spend an Alarming Amount of Time Checking Social Media on
Their Phones, DIGITAL TRENDS (June 13, 2015), http://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/
informate-report-social-media-smartphone-use/
[https://perma.cc/8SJP-TY74]
(demonstrating the vast amount of time that Americans check their phones to either monitor
or update their social media accounts); see also Percentage of U.S. Population with a Social
Network Profile from 2008 to 2016, supra note 14 (rendering that while the current number of
people in the United States using social media in 2016 is about 185 million people, the future
number is estimated to be over 200 million people by 2020).
29
See Margaret Van Houten, Assets to Assets, Dust to Dust: What to Do with a Decedent’s
Digital Identity, 30 A.L.I. A.B.A. 581, 586 (2013) (giving a broad definition of what creates the
digital asset category); see also Cahn, supra note 15, at 36 (highlighting that there are different
types and categories of digital assets: personal, social media, financial, and business).
30
See Conner, supra note 13, at 303 (noting that there is currently not a definition of digital
assets in the legal dictionary, which leads to legal scholars and practitioners lacking an
understanding of what a digital asset is and allowing them to come up with their own
definition); see also Van Houten, supra note 29, at 586 (defining digital assets); see also Cahn,
supra note 15, at 36 (reiterating that digital assets are thought of through different categories,
such as personal assets, social media, financial assets, and business assets).
31
See Van Houten, supra note 29, at 586–87 (illustrating that digital assets take on many
forms, some of which are documents created by individuals who have passed); see also
Lumturije Akiti, Facebook off Limits? Protecting Teachers’ Private Speech on Social Networking
Sites, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 119, 121–22 (2012) (exposing that social media has revolutionized the
way in which communication over the Internet, and in general, is conducted). Facebook and
other social media sites are becoming a substitute for communication from regular phone
calls and even texts. Akiti, supra note 31, at 121–22. The growth of Facebook, from being
open to college students to the world, shows how much of an integral part of communication
social media has become. Id.
32
See, e.g., Terms of Service, FACEBOOK (Jan. 30, 2015), https://www.facebook.com/
legal/terms [https://perma.cc/VS2P-NGWC] [hereinafter FACEBOOK] (canvasing the terms
required to use Facebook and post on the site, which each new user must agree to before
using the social media site); see also Terms of Use, INSTAGRAM (Jan. 19, 2013),
https://instagram.com/about/legal/terms/ [https://perma.cc/A7JN-FJRA] [hereinafter
INSTAGRAM] (setting out the Terms of Use when signing up to the Instagram social media
account); Terms of Service, TWITTER (May 18, 2015), https://twitter.com/tos?lang=en
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terms in the document bind the user’s presence on Facebook.33 Facebook
defines how to use the account and set up the account to ensure privacy
for the user, while maintaining a license over the content posted on the
site.34 The terms bind the Facebook user with no opportunity to
negotiate.35 Only the individual who signs up for Facebook is deemed
able to access and use the profile, unless the user and Facebook expressly
grant permission otherwise.36 The user agrees to any terms the social
media site deems fit to establish, no matter if one disagrees or later finds
issue with the terms.37

[https://perma.cc/VLC9-NR42] [hereinafter TWITTER] (outlining the Terms of Service for
potential Twitter users).
33
See, e.g., FACEBOOK, supra note 32 (clarifying that the Terms of Service of Facebook
should be taken seriously by the user and treated as a binding contract). The specific
language of the beginning of the Terms of Service are:
This Statement of Rights and Responsibilities (“Statement,” “Terms,” or
“SSR”) derives from the Facebook Principles and is our terms of service
that governs our relationship with users and others who interact with
Facebook brands, products and services, which we call the “Facebook
Services” or “Services.” By using or accessing the Facebook Services,
you agree to this Statement, as updated from time to time in accordance
with Section 13 below. Additionally, you will find resources at the end
of this document that help you understand how Facebook works.
Id.
34
See id. (“you [,the user,] specifically give us the following permission, subject to your
privacy and application settings: you grant us a non-exclusive, transferable, sub-licensable,
royalty-free, worldwide license . . . to content that you post on or in connection with
Facebook.”); see also What is My Profile, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/
133986550032744 [https://perma.cc/X85F-UJHY] (issuing that a profile on Facebook is the
individual’s collection of pictures, stories, and events that tell the user’s life story on
Facebook); What Is a Facebook Page?, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/
174987089221178 [https://perma.cc/4UR3-A3ME] (detailing that Facebook pages are used
in connection with businesses, organizations, and brands to share pictures, posts, and events
with people who like their page).
35
See FACEBOOK, supra note 32 (construing that the Terms of Service are binding when the
user signs up and begins to use Facebook for the social networking use for which it was
designed); see also About Facebook, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/facebook/info/
?tab=pageinfo [https://perma.cc/4A6T-GNPY] (promoting that Facebook was founded on
February 4, 2004, and provides general information on Facebook, such as the description and
the mission statement of Facebook).
36
See FACEBOOK, supra note 32 (outlining a term of Facebook that allows only the Facebook
profile user to access the individual profile in the individual’s name). This particular term
of service specifically states, “You will not transfer your account (including any Page or
application you administer) to anyone without first getting our [, Facebook’s,] written
permission.” Id.
37
See id. (drawing that the terms create a binding contract and once the user assents to
them, the user is bound to abide by the terms as they are stated in the Terms of Service); see
also Nicholas Carlson, At Last—The Full Story of How Facebook Was Founded, BUS. INSIDER (Mar.
5,
2010),
http://www.businessinsider.com/how-facebook-was-founded-2010-3
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Like Facebook, both Twitter and Instagram’s Terms of Use govern the
user’s actions on the social media sites.38 Twitter’s terms state the site has
the right to regulate the user’s access and information posted to the
account.39 These terms bind the user’s usage on the social media site. 40
The Terms of Service require that the terms are considered a contract to
use the service and advise one not enter into the contract unless one is
fully capable and ready to abide by the terms.41 Additionally, Instagram’s
policies are similar to the previous two social media sites.42 When using
[https://perma.cc/4NAM-NWBZ] (detailing the controversy surrounding the creation of
Facebook and its founder, Mark Zuckerberg).
38
See TWITTER, supra note 32 (reflecting on Twitter’s Terms of Service governing a user’s
ability to use the social media site and what is posted on the social media site); see also
INSTAGRAM, supra note 32 (noting that the Terms of Use for Instagram allow for Instagram
to regulate what is posted on its social media site and its ability to use the pictures posted for
its own use).
39
See INSTAGRAM, supra note 32 (outlining what is to be agreed to by a new user, in which
the terms are similar in nature to those of other social media sites); see also TWITTER, supra
note 32 (construing that Twitter governs the users on its site and makes this known to new
users through the Terms of Service). Twitter construes this to its new users by stating:
These Terms of Service (“Terms”) govern your access to and use of our
Services, including our various websites, SMS, APIs, email notifications,
applications, buttons, widgets, ads, commerce services (the “Twitter
Services”), and our other covered services that link to these Terms
(collectively, the “Services”), and any information, text, graphics, photos
or other materials uploaded, downloaded or appearing on the Services
(collectively referred to as “Content”). Your access to and use of the
Services are conditioned on your acceptance of and compliance with
these Terms. By accessing or using the Services you agree to be bound
by these Terms.
Id.
40
See TWITTER, supra note 32 (confirming that by signing up and using the social media
site, the user agrees to the Terms of Service as they are outlined in the Terms of Service
hyperlink, which must be clicked on to view the terms); see also New User FAQs, INSTAGRAM
(2016),
https://support.twitter.com/articles/13920
[https://perma.cc/DFY6-8RET]
(offering that Instagram is a way to share lifetime moments with friends and family, as well
as the public).
41
See TWITTER, supra note 32 (confronting that the Terms of Service are a binding contract
that should only be entered into if the party is willing to accept and abide by the terms as
they are stated by Twitter); see also Nicholas Carlson, The Real History of Twitter, BUS. INSIDER
(Apr. 13, 2011), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-twitter-was-founded-2011-4
[https://perma.cc/DZ4S-V8M6] (explaining the real story behind how Twitter started,
through some ex-Googlers and a failed company that later brought the idea of Twitter to the
masses).
42
See INSTAGRAM, supra note 32 (outlining what is to be agreed to by a new user, which
are terms similar in nature to those of other social media sites); see also Nicole Cocozza,
Instagram Sets a Precedent by an “Insta” Change in Social Media Contracts & Users’ Ignorance of
Instagram’s Terms of Use May Lead to Acceptance by a Simple “Snap,” 15 J. HIGH TECH. L. 363,
364 (2014) (elaborating that users tend to ignore the Terms of Use that the social media service
offers for its new users to explore and read prior to agreeing to the service); FAQ, INSTAGRAM
(2016),
https://www.instagram.com/about/faq/
[https://perma.cc/M8ML-Y7LP]
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Instagram, one is agreeing to the terms of Instagram. 43 The terms require
a person to meet a certain age to use Instagram, not post pictures that
depict violence or nudity, and assume responsibility for any activity that
may occur under a profile name or handle.44
Because the concept of inheriting social media accounts is so modern,
little to no case law exists directly addressing digital assets. 45 However,
the case law that does exist uses contract law to decipher the results of the
contract after death to understand inheritability.46 Scholars contend that
Facebook is the primary social media outlet battling conflict when it comes
to accessing the social media site after the user dies.47 For instance, in Fteja
[hereinafter FAQ] (remarking that Instagram is a way to share pictures with friends and
family by taking a picture with a cell phone then posting it on Instagram). Another feature
of Instagram is that the user is allowed to pick a filter for the picture prior to posting it on
Instagram. FAQ, supra note 42.
43
See INSTAGRAM, supra note 32 (urging that the Terms of Use of Instagram are and should
be construed to be a binding contract by the new user with Instagram for its social media or
networking service); see also Lim Yung-Hui, Inspiring Insights by Instagram CEO Kevin
Systrom, The Man Who Built a $1 Billion Startup, FORBES (Apr. 9, 2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/limyunghui/2012/04/09/inspiring-insights-by-instagramceo-kevin-systrom-the-man-who-built-a-1-billion-startup/#761452c25f0f
[https://perma.cc/TRU6-ZSWE] (elaborating on Instagram’s beginning success, and stating
that recently, Facebook bought Instagram for $1 billion).
44
See INSTAGRAM, supra note 32 (providing that a user must be of an age to be aware of
the terms the user is agreeing to when signing up and using the Instagram social media and
networking service); see also Yung-Hui, supra note 43 (expanding on the story of how
Instagram started, how it got its name, and how long it took for the creators to develop
Instagram before it launched).
45
See Cahn, supra note 15, at 36 (reporting that little has been decided in reference to social
media, as well as digital assets as a whole category, and its ability to be inherited or devised
within a will or through intestacy statutes); see also Cocozza, supra note 42, at 366 (asserting
that courts have struggled to define social media contracts and the Terms of Service or Use
within the scope of traditional principles of contract law).
46
See infra Part II.C (rendering that contract law in relation to its use in forming a contract
for the social media site and the terms within the contract will render the decision if social
media can be inherited through probate and intestacy statutes).
47
See, e.g., Louise Boyle, Grieving Parents Battle Facebook for Access to 15-year-old Son’s Profile
after He Committed Suicide, DAILY MAIL (Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/
news/article-2280800/Facebook-bans-parents-accessing-sons-profile-committedsuicide.html [https://perma.cc/5ED2-DKJ4] (discussing the battle Eric Rash’s parents faced
in trying to obtain access to their son’s Facebook profile for possible answers after he
committed suicide); see also Alyssa Bereznak, Delaware Agrees to Let Families Inherit the Social
Media Accounts of the Deceased, YAHOO! (Aug. 19, 2014), https://www.yahoo.com/tech/
delaware-agrees-to-let-families-inherit-the-social-95209129124.html
[https://perma.cc/3UZS-P5BJ] (drawing on the story of Amanda Todd and how her family
was unable to delete the negative comments, or her Facebook account in general, because
they did not have access and the legacy option was not available at the time); Ryan Grenoble,
Amanda Todd: Bullied Canadian Teen Commits Suicide after Prolonged Battle Online and in School,
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 12, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/11/amandatodd-suicide-bullying_n_1959909.html [https://perma.cc/ZC24-XRND] (telling the story of
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v. Facebook, the court held that Facebook’s agreement created a valid
contract using contract of adhesion devises—click-wrap and browse-wrap
agreements.48 Facebook’s terms do not present the potential user with the
Terms of Use before requiring a click of consent to the terms.49 Placing the
link on the welcome page and having people click through creates a
binding contract whether or not the user of the social media site reads the
terms.50 As such, by using the site, the user expressly agrees to the terms
of the site.51 However, it is unclear what would occur to the Facebook
account after the user dies.52
In Ajemian v. Yahoo!, a personal
representative of an estate requested access to a Yahoo! account because
he stated he was a co-user of the account.53 The Massachusetts Court of
Appeals found that administrators are not entitled to access the account

Amanda Todd, a teenage girl who committed suicide after being bullied on Facebook, which
prompted Facebook to create a memorialization page after her death).
48
See 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 837 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (conceding that the agreement Facebook
has in place is not a true form of a click-wrap agreement, rather it is a hybrid of a click-wrap
and browse-wrap). A click-wrap agreement is one that requires a click of agreement by the
user to the terms. Id. A browse-wrap agreement is where the terms are located in a
hyperlink, which must be clicked to be viewed before agreement to the terms. Id.
49
See id. (providing the terms in a separate link, like Facebook does, is the foundational
element a browse-wrap agreement); see also Anne Flaherty, What Happens to Your Online
Accounts When You Die?, DENVER POST (July 18, 2014), http://www.denverpost.com/
business/ci_26175560/what-happens-your-online-accounts-when-you-die
[https://perma.cc/62VE-7Q2P] (offering that most Terms of Service agreements do not
allow anyone who is not the account holder to access the social media site).
50
See Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 837 (visiting Facebook and continuing to use the site is the
assertion of agreement, which is a browse-wrap agreement); see also Cocozza, supra note 42,
at 371 (expressing that the rise in social media sites and the contracts that form the social
media accounts have challenged traditional principles of contract law).
51
Compare Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 837 (agreeing to the terms is essential to continued use
of the website); with Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 29–30 (2d Cir. 2002)
(proposing that a click of assent is not consent, unless the site makes it explicitly clear to the
user the terms he or she is agreeing to before continuing).
52
See Ajemian v. Yahoo! Inc., 987 N.E.2d 604, 606 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013) (pointing out that
there is no clear rule to indicate if a digital asset of a deceased individual should be accessed
by the personal representative of the estate); see also Tamara Castagna, Twitter: Chatter and
Substance, 21 AUSTL. L. LIBR. 90, 94 (2013) (contrasting the issue of social media from a
business perspective and how the policies within the social media platform will determine
how companies use the social media to further their business online).
53
See 987 N.E.2d at 607 (claiming that one was a part of the contract is not enough, it must
be documented on the contract who is a party to the contract and who is authorized to access
the email account); see also Hayley Tsukayama, Facebook Will Now Let You Manage What
Happens to Your Account after You Die, WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/02/12/facebook-willnow-let-you-manage-what-happens-to-your-account-after-you-die/
[https://perma.cc/V36R-8X9H] (detailing the recent addition to Facebook, in which the
social media site granted users the ability to choose what would happen to their Facebook
profile after they die: the profile can be deleted or the profile can be memorialized).
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of the deceased individual they are administrating, even if the
administrator is a relative.54 To prevent a personal representative or the
administrator of an estate access to social media accounts, the formation
of these accounts as a contract of adhesion evidences the need to prevent
access.55
B. Social Media Accounts as Contracts of Adhesion
Contracts of adhesion are contracts that are standardized, imposed,
and drafted by the party with the greater bargaining power, requiring the
party seeking the service to either accept or reject the contract.56 Social
media accounts are created by contracts of adhesion formed by click-wrap
agreements, browse-wrap agreements, or a combination of both.57
Another view of social media, not readily provided by scholars, is that a
54
See Ajemian, 987 N.E.2d at 614 (establishing the rule that even though a relative wants
access to the digital asset of a deceased loved one, being the personal representative of the
estate does not establish a valid position to be allowed access); see also Castagna, supra note
52, at 93 (presenting that with the use of social media, such as Twitter, confidentiality issues
stem from the amount of information that the user posts online).
55
See infra Part II.B (detailing that the creation of social media accounts as contracts of
adhesion furthers the argument that access by a third party representative of the deceased’s
estate should not be permitted).
56
See Bradberry v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. C06-6567 CW, 2007 WL 1241936, at *4 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 27, 2007) (defining a contract of adhesion in a cellphone plan as a take it or leave it
contract with only the opportunity to accept or reject the contract); see also Fiederlein v.
Boutselis, 952 N.E.2d 847, 856 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (finding that a contract requires offer,
acceptance, consideration, and a meeting of the minds between the parties to properly form
a contract). When a contract is formed in the traditional way, there is no disparity in
bargaining power between the two parties. Fiederlein, 952 N.E.2d at 856. Each party to the
contract has the opportunity to bargain and make counteroffers. Id. This is the basic
formation of a contract, but social media accounts are not created in this way. Id. Social
media accounts are created through contracts, which are different in formation and in
bargaining power; parties are still required to assent to the terms, but fewer seem to be
required. Id. There is no need for offer, acceptance, and consideration because a potential
new user must agree to the Terms of Service as they are for everyone who chooses to use the
social media site. Id. See also Houston v. Hyatt Regency Indianapolis, 997 F. Supp. 2d 914,
922 (S.D. Ind. 2014) (showing that the basic building blocks of a contract “include offer,
acceptance, consideration, and a meeting of the minds” between the parties forming the
contract); cf. Econ. Leasing Co., Ltd. v. Wood, 427 N.E.2d 483, 487 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (stating
that a meeting of the minds was not required to find a breach of contract); Weaver v. Am.
Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144, 147 (Ind. 1971) (noting that a traditional contract is formed as a result
of bargaining among the parties to the contract when both have equal bargaining power, or
when no one party has more power over the other).
57
See Ajemian, 987 N.E.2d at 614 (comprehending that contracts can be formed differently,
using both agreements in an adhesion contract, to create a binding contractual relationship
between the site and the non-user); see also Adhesion Contract, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d
ed. 2006) (defining “adhesion contract” as “[a] standard-form contract prepared by one
party, to be signed by another party in a weaker position, usu[ally] a consumer, who adheres
to the contract with little choice about the terms”).
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social media account is a contractual relationship between the user and
the social media parent site.58 Moreover, in Schlobohm v. Spa Petite, the
Supreme Court of Minnesota held that the contract to become a member
of a spa and gym was an adhesion contract. 59 The contract for the gym
service was comprised of a printed form, which was consistent with other
gym contracts and was the same contract every member was required to
sign before joining the gym.60 The court reasoned there was no disparity
between the bargaining powers of the parties. 61
In addition, contracts of adhesion are found in two forms—click-wrap
and browse-wrap agreements.62 Click-wrap agreements are contracts
which require a user to click an “I agree” box when signing up for a
service.63 Within the social media context, a user must consent to the terms
58
Compare Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 837 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (pointing out
that Facebook is a contract that is created when the new user agrees to the terms before
setting up a profile), with Fiederlein, 952 N.E.2d at 856 (admitting that there is a distinction
between traditional contract formation and contracts that are created through adhesion, in
particular the meeting of the minds and bargaining relationship associated with creating the
contract). It is the view in Fteja that many scholars do not give credit to. Rather, scholars
view social media and posts on social media as the personal property of the individual,
which allows for social media to be considered a portion of the estate of the deceased
individual.
59
See 326 N.W.2d 920, 924 (Minn. 1982) (issuing that the contract was a form contract,
which the gym created for all potential new members to agree to and sign before beginning
working out at Spa Petite); see also Cocozza, supra note 42, at 376 (identifying that the
American Bar Association (“ABA”) has a set of rules for electronic contracting to avoid
issues, which are: (1) the user must have notice that terms exist; (2) the user has an
opportunity to review the terms; (3) the user has notice that taking an optional action is
assent; and (4) the user must have taken the optional action). Click-wrap agreements are
agreements that fully satisfy each of these rules set out by the ABA. Cocozza, supra note 42,
at 376.
60
See Schlobohm, 326 N.W.2d at 921 (expressing that the contract Schlobohm signed,
consisting of four pages outlining the terms and conditions of the gym, which were all on
the first page so the new member would see them); see also James Grimmelmann, Saving
Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1149 (2009) (relying that with the contract comes privacy
issues because of the amount of information required to set-up a complete social media
profile).
61
See Schlobohm, 326 N.W.2d at 925 (holding that the contract for the Spa Petite gym
service was an adhesion contract drafted by Spa Petite); see also Cocozza, supra note 42, at 375
(providing an example of one online adhesion contract, a browse-wrap contract, which
requires a user to click on a link with the Terms of Use at the bottom of the page).
62
See Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 229, 236 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (determining that
there are different types of Internet agreements that are important to know and note for a
better understanding of social media contracting); see also Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc.,
763 F.3d 1171, 1175–76 (9th Cir. 2014) (detailing that contracts on the Internet take two forms,
click-wrap and browse-wrap agreements, and detailing that Barnes & Noble’s terms and
conditions, which constituted a browse-wrap agreement, must be agreed to before
purchasing a product online).
63
See Feldman, 513 F. Supp. 2d at 236 (claiming that the agreement with Google required
the new user to manifest his or her intent by clicking the “I agree” button on the page to
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of the social media site before proceeding through the process and
participating in the social media site.64 For example, Facebook, Twitter,
and Instagram all have elements that are examples of click-wrap
agreements because they require the user to click “agree” before allowing
the user to proceed with creating an account or profile.65
More specifically, on Facebook, to agree and continue to create a
Facebook profile, the potential new user must click the “Sign Up” button
before proceeding through the process to create a profile.66 The click of
“Sign Up” is the assent element for a click-wrap agreement.67 However,
Facebook does not provide the presentation of the actual Terms of Use for
the potential new user in the true click-wrap agreement.68 Thus, Facebook

make the Terms of Use or service binding on the parties to the contract); see also Cocozza,
supra note 42, at 376 (inferring that the click-wrap agreement requires the potential user to
fully scroll through the terms to prevent any potential notice issues a user may claim, which
is the problem with browse-wrap agreements).
64
See Feldman, 513 F. Supp. 2d at 236 (requiring a user to agree to the terms before
proceeding through the sign up process makes the user read and agree to the terms to which
the user must abide); see also Banta, supra note 7, at 821 (ordering that a user must click on
the dialogue box to agree to the agreement or contract, or be unable to continue setting up
the social media profile).
65
See, e.g., Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 837 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting
Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 429 (2d Cir. 2004) (describing that a click-wrap
agreement “presents the potential licensee with a message on his or her computer screen,
requiring that the user manifest his or her assent to the terms of the license agreement by
clicking on an icon”)); see also Zaltz v. JDate, 952 F. Supp. 2d 439, 451 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)
(following that the user of the online dating site must click agree before proceeding through
to set up the user’s online dating profile). In order to sign up for JDate, Zaltz had to
repeatedly click on boxes agreeing to certain terms of the online dating site. Zaltz, 952 F.
Supp. 2d at 451. Zaltz’s inability to recall agreeing to these terms was unpersuasive to the
court to negate and invalidate the browse-wrap and click-wrap combination adhesion
contract. Id. The agreement in this particular case is analogous to the agreement in Fteja,
which the court in this case heavily relied upon to come to its decision. Id.
66
See Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 837 (stating that the user must agree to the terms by clicking
the agree button to create a Facebook profile and use the social media service the site
provides); see also FACEBOOK, supra note 32 (outlining the terms and conditions a user agrees
to when he or she signs up for a Facebook profile).
67
See Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 837 (asserting that clicking agree is the electronic equivalent
of a signature on a traditional contract); see also Zaltz, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 452 (rendering that
the Second Circuit has found that assent to the contractual terms not only requires
agreement, but the Terms of Use or Service must be given to the user in clear notice of the
terms).
68
See Zaltz, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 452 (describing that a true click-wrap agreement presents
the terms and conditions to be agreed to on the same page as the agree button, not in a
separate link or page that the user has to visit to read the terms); see also Robert V. Hale II,
Recent Developments in Online Consumer Contracts, 71 BUS. LAW. 353, 357–58 (Winter 2015–
2016) (commenting that the correct standard to follow in regards to a user agreeing to the
terms is that of the reasonable person standard, or the consumer must know what he or she
is assenting to).
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falls short on being purely a click-wrap agreement.69 In Fteja, the court
held that Facebook’s agreement did not meet the true meaning and
definition of a click-wrap agreement.70 Facebook did not present the
potential user with the Terms of Use before requiring a click of assent to
the terms.71 Rather, the court held that Facebook utilized a combination
of a click-wrap and browse-wrap agreements.72
Under a true browse-wrap agreement, a user does not see the Terms
of Use before clicking sign up or continuing to use the social media site.73
This foundation that a browse-wrap agreement is built on means the user
does not view any terms before continuing on the website. 74 Placing the
link on the welcome page and having people physically click through the
terms creates a binding contract, regardless of whether the user of the
69
See Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 837–38 (cautioning that Facebook is not true form of a clickwrap agreement because Facebook fails to provide the terms on the same webpage where
the agree button is located); see also Hale, supra note 68, at 357 (declining to follow the
precedent set out in Fteja because the case mischaracterized the importance of the reasonable
person standard to notice that clicking agree is assenting to the terms of the social media
site).
70
See Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 837 (conceding that the agreement Facebook has in place is
not a true form of a click-wrap agreement, rather it is a hybrid of a click-wrap and browsewrap); see also Juliet M. Moringiello & William L. Reynolds, From Lord Coke to Internet Privacy:
The Past, Present, and Future of the Law of Electronic Contracting, 72 MD. L. REV. 452, 466–67
(2013) (admitting that a classic browse-wrap agreement may be thought of as a “pay now,
terms later transaction,” where the terms are hyperlinked on the home page of the website);
Cheryl B. Preston, “Please Note: You Have Waived Everything”: Can Notice Redeem Online
Contracts?, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 535, 547 (2015) (pointing out that scholars and courts have been
unsure as to the distinction that may or may not be made between click-wrap and browsewrap agreements).
71
See Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 837 (providing the terms in a separate link, like Facebook
does, is the foundational element of a browse-wrap agreement); see also Moringiello &
Reynolds, supra note 70, at 468 (deciding that courts are favoring the approach of
determining the conscionability of the contract rather than basing the decision of
enforceability on whether the contract is a click-wrap or browse-wrap agreement).
72
See Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 838 (reasoning that Facebook is a combination because the
terms and conditions are available via a link, which is the browse-wrap element, but
agreement to the terms is required by clicking agree, which is the click-wrap element); see
also Moringiello & Reynolds, supra note 70, at 469 (presenting that the actual focus of
discussion should be on the presentation of the terms and not on the distinction between
click-wrap and browse-wrap agreements).
73
See Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 837 (accessing the terms via a link is the classic form of a
browse-wrap agreement). When Fteja signed up for the service, he had a duty to click the
link to read the terms before clicking agree to continue signing up for Facebook. Id.
Hyperlinking the terms is how a browse-wrap agreement creates a binding agreement,
which is many times overlooked by the potential new user. Id.
74
See id. (manifesting a browse-wrap agreement by continuing to use the site whether or
not the new user read the terms in the hyperlink for the website); see also Preston, supra note
70, at 547 (confirming that a large and increasing number of courts are continuing to uphold
and enforce browse-wrap agreements, which the user does not see the terms of the contract
before using the website).
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social media site reads the terms.75 Facebook and other similar sites put
on their websites that when using the site for social networking, the user
is consenting to the site’s Terms of Use.76 Thus, when a user posts any
picture or statement, the user is manifesting his or her agreement to all of
the terms of the browse-wrap, click-wrap combination contract of
adhesion.77
Browse-wrap agreements are seen on sites where one purchases an
item or browses a website for its content because the terms are generally
listed on the webpage.78 For example, in Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble, the
plaintiff’s suit focused on a portion of the Terms of Use of the website that
the plaintiff agreed to when placing his order online. 79 The court found
the Terms of Use was a browse-wrap agreement because the terms were
implied when visiting the Barnes & Noble website to place an order, and
the terms were located in a hyperlink at the bottom of the webpage.80 The
75
See Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 837 (visiting Facebook and continuing to use the site is the
assertion of an agreement which is one component of a browse-wrap agreement); see also
Preston, supra note 70, at 561 (providing an example of a browse-wrap agreement in that the
binding mechanism is when “you visit or shop at Amazon.com”) (emphasis in original).
76
See, e.g., FACEBOOK, supra note 32 (discussing the terms a new user agrees to when
signing up for Facebook); see also Helen Glaberson, Who Gets Your Facebook When You Die?,
GOOD HOUSEKEEPING (July 31, 2015), http://www.goodhousekeeping.com/life/
a33700/facebook-legacy-feature/ [https://perma.cc/7JDU-LGQS] (introducing that in
February 2015, Facebook established a new feature in its Terms of Service that allows a user
to choose who can manage the account after the user dies). By manage, Facebook does not
mean that the individual the user chooses has full access to the profile like the user had when
alive, but rather the individual has the ability to tell Facebook to memorialize the account or
delete it. Glaberson, supra note 76. Nowhere within this new addition to its policy does
Facebook give the third party the ability to take on the account as his or her own account,
like Ashley’s mother did in Part I of this Note. Id.
77
See Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 838 (reiterating that Facebook, as an adhesion contract, is a
combination of click-wrap and browse-wrap agreements); see also John Bonazzo, Do You Need
to Control Your Online Identity after Your Death?, OBSERVER (Feb. 22, 2016),
http://observer.com/2016/02/how-to-control-your-online-life-after-you-die/
[https://perma.cc/9LKK-TP2N] (asserting that access must be given to the third party
before the original user’s death or else there will criminal liability).
78
See Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir. 2014) (stating browsewrap agreements are in pure form when a website states that by using the site you are
manifesting agreement to the Terms of Use or service of that particular site). Barnes & Noble,
which is the website in the case, is an example of this type of agreement in that the user
agrees to the terms by browsing the website for books or other goods sold online. Id.
79
See id. (finding that the issue with the Barnes & Noble adhesion contract was that there
was no actual notice to the customer, which courts have consistently required with browsewrap agreements to be held valid and not unconscionable). The plaintiff ordered a tablet off
of the Barnes & Noble website and was later notified his purchase had been cancelled
because the order could not be filled due to the tablet being sold out. Id.
80
See id. (indicating the type of agreement Barnes & Noble had on its website would bind
its customers to its terms, but lacked the notice required for the agreement to be legally sound
and binding for the customer); see also Cahn, supra note 15, at 38 (allowing another individual
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Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held there must be something more than
a hyperlink placed on the page to let the user know that the terms exist
and that the user is agreeing to them by visiting the site.81
Nevertheless, contracts of adhesion carry a stigma of being
unconscionable because of the disparity in the bargaining power between
the parties.82 For any contract to be unconscionable, there must be a
presence of both procedural and substantive unconscionability. 83
Procedural unconscionability “focuses on the manner in which the
contract was negotiated and the circumstances of the parties.”84
to access a social media account, or more broadly a digital asset account, would violate the
social media agreement); but cf. Tsukayama, supra note 53 (declaring that Facebook now has
an option for its users to name who they would like to have control over their Facebook
account after they die for a short amount of time, only to determine if the account should be
deleted or memorialized).
81
See Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1178–79 (stating knowledge that the terms are located on the
page or through a hyperlink is required to bind the user to the Terms of Use or Service of the
social media site). The court specifically stated in its holding:
[W]e therefore hold that where a website makes its terms of use
available via a conspicuous hyperlink on every page of the website but
otherwise provides no notice to users nor prompts them to take an
affirmative action to demonstrate assent, even close proximity of the
hyperlink to relevant buttons users must click on—without more—is
insufficient to give rise to constructive notice. While failure to read a
contract before agreeing to its terms does not relieve party of its
obligations under the contract . . . the onus must be on website owners
to put users on notice of the terms to which they wish to bind
consumers.
Id.
82
See Bradberry v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. C06-6567 CW, 2007 WL 1241936, at *4 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 27, 2007) (providing that a contract of adhesion comes with the battle to prove that
the contract is conscionable and therefore enforceable); see also Unconscionability, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2006) (defining “unconscionability” as “[t]he principle that a court
may refuse to enforce a contract that is unfair or oppressive because of procedural abuses
during contract formation or because of overreaching contractual terms, esp[ecially] terms
that are unreasonably favorable to one party while precluding meaningful choice for the
other party”).
83
See Bradberry, 2007 WL 1241936, at *4 (issuing that a finding of unconscionability in an
adhesion contract for a service must include both procedural and substantive
unconscionability; however, if one is more present than the other, the court may hold the
contract unconscionable if the court determines it to be substantial). In Bradberry, Bradberry
argued that T-Mobile reuses cellphone numbers after charging the subscriptions of the
previous owner of that cell phone number. Id. at *1. The contract for the phone service was
a contract that was the same for each customer, and to overcome and invalidate the adhesion
contract, Bradberry claimed the contract was unconscionable. Id.
84
See id. at *4 (illustrating the meaning of the requirement of procedural unconscionability
in order to determine that a contract is void); see also Procedural Unconscionability, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2006) (defining “procedural unconscionability” as
“[u]nconscionability resulting from improprieties in contract formation (such as oral
misrepresentations or disparities in bargaining position) rather than from the terms of the
contract itself”).
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Substantive unconscionability refers to the contractual language. 85 In
addition to the procedural and substantive requirements, another factor
used by the courts is to look at the service provided.86 If the service is a
public service or an essential service, the service is necessary.87 If the
service is not a necessity, it generally means that the service can be found
somewhere else.88 Services that are commonly categorized as public
necessities are hospitals and consulting a doctor or lawyer. 89
While social media accounts are created through a valid, conscionable
contract, many scholars and estate planning attorneys incorrectly
categorize social media as personal property. 90 The court in Nelson v. La
85
See Bradberry, 2007 WL 1241936, at *4 (declaring the focus on what is required for
substantive unconscionability); see also Substantive Unconscionability, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2006) (defining “substantive unconscionability” as “[u]nconscionability
resulting from contract terms that are unduly harsh, commercially unreasonable, and grossly
unfair given the existing circumstances”).
86
See Schlobohm v. Spa Petite, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 920, 924 (Minn. 1982) (illustrating that
providing a gym membership and exercise training is not an essential service); see also
Moringiello & Reynolds, supra note 70, at 469 (advocating that procedural unconscionability
alone is not enough to find a contract unconscionable; there must be some finding of
substantive unconscionability, even if it is not as great as procedural).
87
See Schlobohm, 326 N.W.2d at 925 (reasoning that if a service is essential and there is
unequal bargaining power and the terms of the contract strongly favor one party, the court
will tend to find unconscionability and the contract will be voidable); see also Preston, supra
note 70, at 584 (speculating that if social media sites and other online services were to allow
users to partially negotiate the terms, then the issue of awareness and notice of the terms
would be alleviated and potential users would be given some bargaining power, which
would then alleviate potential unconscionability).
88
See Schlobohm, 326 N.W.2d at 925 (finding that the service Spa Petite provides to the
customer is not an essential service, rather it is a service that could be received at another
gym); see also Anderson v. McOskar Enterprises, Inc., 712 N.W.2d 796, 802 (Minn. Ct. App.
2006) (reiterating that a gym service is not service that is a public necessity).
89
See Schlobohm, 326 N.W.2d at 925 (demonstrating that services that are necessities are
generally those that are regulated by the government in some capacity or another, such as
police and fire departments; gym memberships are not a service regulated by the
government); see also Steven W. Feldman, Mutual Assent, Normative Degradation, and Mass
Market Standard Form Contracts—A Two-Part Critique of Boilerplate: The Fine Print, Vanishing
Rights and the Rule of Law (Part I), 62 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 373, 383 (2014) (admitting that some
jurisdictions have different elements for what constitutes an adhesion contract, and one
example is in Maryland, which states that contracts of adhesion are generally those whose
nature is essential to society).
90
See Pinch, supra note 14, at 547–48 (grouping digital assets as property will allow for a
clearer understanding for estate planning attorneys and their clients in planning for the
future of their digital assets and life on social media). However, Facebook provides several
options that allow an individual user or a user’s estate executor the ability to choose what
will happen after the user’s death, such as having the account deleted or memorialized. What
Would Happen to My Account if I Pass, FACEBOOK (Feb. 2015), https://www.facebook.com/
help/103897939701143 [https://perma.cc/SSP4-XGNR]. Deleting an account is possible
through a setting in the privacy section on Facebook. Id. Memorializing an account for a
deceased individual is done through a request submitted to Facebook by a family member
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Tourette, where a subcontract agreement was created to deliver mail from
one town to another numerous times, held that the contract was not
personal property.91 The court reasoned that personal property is
something where value is determined and the owner has interest in the
property ownership.92
Conversely, a contract is not regarded as personal property even
though a contract may hold value to the parties involved; personal
property is the value in the thing itself.93 In Meek v. State, the court held
that personal property generally means the valuable right in the item itself
or in the value of the interest in the item.94 The court stated that property

or friend. Memorialization Request, FACEBOOK (2016), https://www.facebook.com/help/
contact/1605213279719667 [https://perma.cc/3MJ3-57QW].
91
See 178 N.E.2d 67, 68 (Ind. Ct. App. 1961) (qualifying that the contract was for a personal
service contracted for by a woman when she moved from one town to another in Indiana).
Here, the contract for a personal service is a subset of personal property while the contract is
still valid and in use by both parties. Id. Once one of the two parties to the contract dies, the
contract is no longer in use or enforceable, and can no longer be considered personal
property. Id. Here, the contract ceased when the woman passed away, and there was no
need for the mail to be delivered from one location to the next. Id.
92
See id. (proving that a contract is not personal property because once a party to the
contract dies, there is no longer any value in the contract to be considered personal property);
see also Personal Property, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2006) (defining “personal
property” as “[a]ny movable or intangible thing that is subject to ownership and not
classified as real property”).
93
See Nelson, 178 N.E.2d at 68 (holding that a contract is not an item of personal property,
but can be subject to an item of personal property belonging to an individual). But see IND.
CODE § 32-17-14-3(11) (2016) (establishing that property is “any present or future interest in
real property, intangible personal property, or tangible personal property”); § 32-17-14-3(4)
(defining intangible personal property as “incorporeal property, such as money, credits,
shares of stock, bonds, notes, other evidences of indebtedness, and other evidence of
property interests”). These definitions provide that personal property is something that is
movable in nature at the time of sale. § 32-17-14-3(4). See also Meek v. State, 185 N.E. 899,
901 (Ind. 1933) (stating when it is possible for a contract to be personal property based on the
value of the contract); How Do I Save a Photo to My Phone or Computer, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/help/155361567863444
[https://perma.cc/L4RZ-9LG8]
(declaring that Facebook provides a way for users or loved ones to save pictures without
obtaining access to the profile).
94
See 185 N.E. at 901 (defining how to determine if an item is personal property based on
the ability to assign a value to the item). The Indiana Supreme Court found that there was a
dispute over what was to be considered personal property of an individual and decided that
the decision came down to the control over the object. Id. In Meek, the court held that a
widow had control over her husband’s deceased body after it was stolen from its grave. Id.
See also Browning v. Walters, 616 N.E.2d 1040, 1047 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (“personal property
includes not only the property itself but all of the owner’s rights and interests in that
property”); Wolf v. Wolf, 259 N.E.2d 89, 90 (Ind. Ct. App. 1970) (demonstrating that a U.S.
Savings Bond purchased jointly with the deceased ex-husband was the personal property of
the wife and the ex-husband jointly).
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rights in some objects may be more limited than others depending on the
interest in the object of the owner.95
Furthermore, property is classified as something which is not
movable, a house or land, or something of a physical nature, a car or
livestock.96 In Low v. LinkedIn, the account holder challenged the personal
property right, claiming the browsing history within the social media site
was the personal property of the account holder. 97 Account holders
argued their search history was valuable and identifiable to their
particular account and it constituted a property ownership right. 98 The
court did not agree and held that Low failed to show that LinkedIn took
control and interest in the browse history, which led to the browse history

95
See Meek, 185 N.E. at 901 (giving the exception to the control rule to determine the
ownership of property and if the object is property overall); see also IND. CODE § 32-17-143(11) (defining personal property, and among the types listed in the statute, social media
cannot fall into any of the categories of personal property).
96
See Nelson, 178 N.E.2d at 68 (listing items which are considered property based on some
characteristics associated with property, such as it being physical and non-movable); see also
Low v. LinkedIn Corp., 900 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1017–18 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (providing that in Low,
the traditional idea of what constituted personal property was proposed to be altered to
include the browse history of a social media account into the category of personal property
of an individual); cf. Claridge v. RockYou, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 2d 855, 864 (N.D. Cal. 2011)
(expressing that when an asset is the personal property of the individual, the loss of that
property will result in loss of complete control over the property, not just the loss of value of
the property). In Claridge, the plaintiff claimed he had lost property value in his personal
information when the RockYou software he used was hacked into and lost. 785 F. Supp. 2d
at 858. The RockYou software required the plaintiff to provide email and social media
account passwords when purchasing the software, and the plaintiff claimed that this
constituted ownership, making the software the personal property of the plaintiff. Id.
97
See 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1018 (proposing that a social media outlet may constitute personal
property through the user typing in individual names in the search history); cf. Jaweed
Kaleem, Death on Facebook Now Common as “Dead Profiles” Create Vast Virtual Cemetery,
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 17, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/07/deathfacebook-dead-profiles_n_2245397.html [https://perma.cc/XHL2-2QF9] (providing that
dead Facebook profiles are being compared to a virtual cemetery because of Facebook’s new
policy of memorializing accounts of deceased users). Allowing social media to be accessed,
like the property of the individual, will make Facebook more susceptible to becoming an
Internet graveyard to the profiles of the deceased. Id. See also Stav Dimitropoulos, Digital
Immortality: The Social Media Sites for Dead People, GLOBAL COMMENT (Oct. 6, 2015),
http://globalcomment.com/digital-immortality-the-social-media-sites-for-dead-people/#
[https://perma.cc/5SW5-JH2N] (reiterating that Facebook is becoming a sort of Internet
graveyard to social media accounts of the dead through memorialization).
98
See Low, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1018 (propositioning that the value in searching for
something through one’s own ability constitutes the personal property of the user, giving
the search value solely to the user). For Low’s view of ownership of the browse history to
hold true, the court determined that the plaintiff must show that with the invasion and use
of the browse history on the LinkedIn profiles, there was injury suffered and loss of property
as a result. Id. If there is not a showing of injury, the browse history could not be the personal
property of the LinkedIn account holder. Id.
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not being the personal property of the account holder. 99 Providing that
there is no personal value in contracts of adhesion evidences the need to
understand the applicable state and federal law.100
C. Indiana Probate Law and Applicable Federal Law
Everyone has the freedom to choose the disposition of their property
after their death.101 As such, individuals may create a will or trust to
provide for their heirs or descendants after their death.102 After death, an
individual’s possessions are divided into two categories: probate and
non-probate property.103 Contracts tend to fall within the non-probate
category, passing outside of probate through a will substitute. 104 Typical
contracts under the non-probate category are those that have monetary
value associated with them, such as life insurance, pay-on-death accounts,

99
See id. at 1028 (reasoning that the court found that Low needed to show more to prove
she had personal value in the browse or search history to lead the court to find that it was
the personal property of Low). Personal value in the product is not an element to prove that
something is property, rather it is the value of the object itself. Id.
100
See infra Part II.C (introducing that the applicable Indiana probate law and the federal
law provides an argument for why contracts of adhesion should not be able to be accessed
after the death of a contracting party).
101
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 16, at 3 (expressing the American system of
succession allows an individual to choose what to do with one’s property after death). A
traditional probate term and rule, the dead hand control rule, is fundamental to the
American probate system. Id. at 1. Dead hand control allows for the deceased individual to
govern what is to be done with his or her estate through a will or will substitute. Id. See also
Cahn, supra note 15, at 37 (determining what happens to social media accounts after a user
dies is a question that has many scholars talking). Because of this, technology companies are
taking steps to ensure they and their users are covered and have directives to determine what
will happen to the accounts after a user dies. Cahn, supra note 15, at 37. Twitter will
deactivate an account after being notified by the personal representative that the user is dead.
Id. This is different from Facebook, which provides two options to a user, one in which the
account is deleted, and second in which the account is memorialized. Id.
102
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 16, at 1 (stating that the freedom to dispose of an
individual’s property is done mainly through the means of a will or a trust instrument); see
also Will, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d. ed. 2006) (defining “will” as “[a] document by which
a person directs his or her estate to be distributed upon death”); Trust, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2006) (providing that a “trust” is “[t]he right, enforceable solely in
equity, to the beneficial enjoyment of property to which another person holds the legal title”).
103
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 16, at 41 (instructing that property is divided into
two categories, which will determine how the property is to be divided after the testator’s
death according to the will or will substitute the decedent leaves behind); see also Probate
Estate, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2006) (defining “probate estate” as “[a] decedent’s
property subject to administration by a personal representative”).
104
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 16, at 42 (establishing that contracts fall within
the non-probate, will substitute category); see also Nonprobate, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d
ed. 2006) (quoting the definition of “nonprobate” as “[o]f or relating to some method of
transmitting property at death other than by a gift by will”).
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inter vivos trusts, and joint tenancies.105 On the other hand, contracts that
have yet to be completed by the deceased at the time of death forward the
obligation to the personal representative to continue and perform the
contract to its fulfillment.106 However, the law is not clear if social media
contracts pass under non-probate or are contracts that bring an obligation
upon the personal representative of the an estate to fulfill the contracted
terms.107
Accessing social media accounts is not only governed by the law of
the state where the deceased individual died, but also the Stored
Communications Act (“SCA”) and the Uniform Fiduciary Access to
Digital Accounts Act (“UFADAA”), both federal acts.108 The SCA
provides criminal liability for unauthorized access to stored electronic
information or communications systems. 109 Criminal liability will arise
when there is intentional access without authorization, or if the individual
“intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that facility.”110 The SCA
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 16, at 42 (introducing examples of non-probate
contracts that are will substitutes). All of these will substitutes are created through a
contract, but the contract created is a traditional contract, not a contract of adhesion, like
social media accounts. Id.
106
See IND. CODE § 29-1-13-13 (2016) (instructing the personal representative that if at the
time of the deceased’s death he or she was under a contractual obligation, the personal
representative must carry out the terms of the contract to its fulfillment); see also Michael J.
Milazzo, Facebook, Privacy, and Reasonable Notice: The Public Policy Problems with Facebook’s
Current Sign-Up Process and How to Remedy the Legal Issues, 23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 661,
682 (2014) (depending on if the contract is completed or terminated, the outcome of the
contract is determined if the parties complete the contract or terminate it for whatever
reason).
107
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 16, at 42 (expressing that there are certain
contracts that fall within the non-probate category and do not pass through probate); see also
§ 29-1-13-13 (proving that there is time when a contract is to be carried out by a personal
representative of a deceased’s estate, that time being if there is a remaining obligation to the
other party in the contract which had yet to be fully completed at the time of death of the
deceased).
108
See 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2012) (explaining the offense, which is punishable if a fiduciary
unlawfully accesses the deceased individual’s account without properly obtaining
permission from the court or through other means); see also Uniform Fiduciary Access to
Digital
Assets
Act
(“UFADAA”),
UNIF.
LAW
COMM’N
(2014),
http://www.uniformlaws.org1/shared/docs/Fiduciary%20Access%C20to%C20Digital%
Ässets/2014_UFADAA_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XY9-CLLC] (expressing that the
purpose of the Act is to give the fiduciary access to the electronically stored information of
the deceased without violating the privacy or the Terms of Service provided by the social
media site).
109
See § 2701 (providing criminal consequences to personal representatives who try to
obtain or do obtain access to the electronic information without proceeding through the
proper channels to gain lawful permission to access the social media account).
110
See id. (issuing that for criminal liability to be found, an individual must intentionally
access or exceed the access to the facility without authorization). In addition, the access must
result in obtaining, altering, or preventing access to the communication service and the
105
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provides an exception to criminal liability for persons or entities who
provide “wire or electronic communications services.”111 It is through the
SCA that intentional, disallowed access to a social media account by a
personal representative not only breaches privacy, but also potentially
imposes criminal liability.112
However, the SCA does not specifically mention social media
accounts, but the UFADAA does reference digital assets, which is the
category that social media falls under. 113 Section four of the UFADAA
gives the default power of the deceased’s digital asset to the personal
representative and determines the distinction between the digital assets
that are governed under the UFADAA and the electronic communications
that are governed under the SCA.114 Section four has three subsections
electronic storage devices. Id. See also Bonazzo, supra note 77 (indicating that access could
be given, but it must be done prior to the death of the user or the personal representative,
the third party, will face criminal liability).
111
See § 2701 (differentiating that there are examples as to when access under the Stored
Communications Act (“SCA”) is lawful and will not result in criminal liability). Other
examples of lawful access would be conduct by the user of that service, or access provided
within sections 2703, 2704, or 2518. Id. See also Dan Bates, The Facebook WILL: Social Network
Adds Feature That Lets a Dedicated ‘Legacy Contact’ Edit Your Page After You Die, DAILY MAIL
(Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2950806/The-FacebookSocial-network-adds-feature-lets-dedicated-Legacy-Contact-edit-page-die.html
[https://perma.cc/PD7S-VX8Z] (providing a lawful way for an individual to access the
account after the death of the original user). The legacy feature on Facebook acts as a will
for an individual’s Facebook account. Id. The Legacy Contact will make the decision as to
whether to leave the account as it is, delete it, or memorialize the account. Id. The major risk
with leaving the account as it is, with the access, would be allowing people to believe the
deceased user is in fact alive. Id.
112
See § 2701 (indicating that there are other, more serious potential consequences than a
deceased user’s privacy being violated); see also Milazzo, supra note 106, at 662 (defining
privacy as “the freedom from unauthorized intrusion”).
113
See § 2702 (providing the guidelines for disclosing electronically stored information
either with the permission of the user or without the permission of the user); see also Jeehyeon
(Jenny) Lee, Death and Live Feeds: Privacy Protection in Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets, 2015
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 654, 665 (2015) (expressing that public communication providers are
prohibited from giving out the electronic communications that are stored within them,
unless one of the specific exemptions within § 2702(b) applies); Uniform Fiduciary Access to
Digital Assets Act § 4, UNIF. LAW COMM’N (2014), http://www.uniformlaws.org1/shared/
docs/Fiduciary%20Access%C20to%C20Digital%Ässets/2014_UFADAA_Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9XY9-CLLC] (outlining that the personal representative of the decedent’s
estate is permitted access to the electronically stored information that is disclosed in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2702(b) through a court order or by authorization through the decedent’s will). This section
of the UFADAA is subject to § 8(b), which provides limits to the fiduciary’s access to the
digital asset. Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act § 4.
114
See 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (2012) (establishing that there are certain guidelines that a personal
representative must abide by if trying to gain access to a digital asset); see also Glaberson,
supra note 76 (clarifying that Facebook has certain procedures in place for the Legacy Contact
to be established, such as once the user nominates the Legacy Contact, a message will be sent
to the nominated individual and he or she must agree to be the Legacy Contact).
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that break the covered content into the content protected under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2702(b): any electronically stored information received or sent by the
deceased and any other digital asset of the deceased. 115 The digital asset
content and the electronically stored information is then limited by the
Terms of Service agreement that the user agrees to when signing up for
the service.116
Additionally, Indiana is one of six states that currently have a statute
facilitating a procedure for the deceased’s personal representatives to
access electronically stored documents and information, including any
digital assets that are stored online.117 The personal representative may
submit a written request to the parent site along with letters testamentary
to gain access to the document and information.118 Further, the personal
representative may have to go through the court in the jurisdiction where
the deceased died to request access from the parent site for the documents
or information sought.119 Currently, the Indiana Legislature has a
definition that would define electronically stored information and
documents, which would further allow the personal representative to
access the electronically stored information without the access requested
by the social media parent site.120 At the state level, this statute governs
115
See Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act § 4 (verifying that the content
protected by the UFADAA is “(1) the content of an electronic communication that the
custodian is permitted to disclose under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18
U.S.C. Section 2702(b) [as amended]; (2) any catalogue of electronic communications sent or
received by the decedent; and (3) any other digital asset in which at death the decedent had
a right or interest”).
116
See id. (detailing that the Terms of Service are among several governing terms that can
limit the access a fiduciary is allowed). The two other listed limiting factors in this section of
the UFADAA are copyright law and any other applicable law that would limit the fiduciary’s
power to access the account. Id.
117
See IND. CODE § 29-1-13-1.1 (2016) (providing the Indiana statute that allows for access
to electronically stored information); see also Banta, supra note 7, at 830 (providing that the
five other states that have similar statutes are: Connecticut, Rhode Island, Oklahoma, Idaho,
and Delaware).
118
See § 29-1-13-1.1(b) (establishing the required materials that must be submitted to the
custodian of the digital asset sought according to the statute discussed through this Note);
see also James Rogers, Widow Wins Battle with Apple over Deceased Husband’s Password, FOX
NEWS (Jan. 20, 2016), http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2016/01/20/widow-wins-battlewith-apple-over-deceased-husbands-password.html
[https://perma.cc/96MJ-PQHF]
(providing an example from Canada where a wife was required by Apple to submit proof of
her inheriting everything belonging to her deceased husband, as well as a court order
dictating to Apple that it was to release the password to her deceased husband’s iTunes
account).
119
See § 29-1-13-1.1(b) (contrasting the two ways a personal representative may access the
electronically stored information or documents, one through a court order and the other
through letters testamentary, along with the request to the custodian site).
120
See S. 119-253, 2nd Sess., at 2–3 (Ind. 2016) (amending the statute discussed in this Note,
IND. CODE § 29-1-13-1.1, to define electronic communications and digital assets). The
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how a personal representative may gain access to digital assets, but federal
law must be consulted before a personal representative may have
access.121 At this moment, the Indiana statute allows for access without
regard to the contract.122 However, the statute must consider relevant
contract and federal law to determine that personal representative access
under the current Indiana statute would be in violation of the law.123
III. ANALYSIS
Social media has been in existence since 1997, and in 2016, the term
“social media,” as applied to estate succession, was yet to be cogently and
cohesively defined by Indiana law.124 Determining the inheritability of
social media accounts is the new legal frontier, because currently a
personal representative is permitted to improperly and unlawfully gain

amended statute is effective as of July 1, 2016, and allows access to the electronic
communication or digital assets of the deceased individual. Id. The exact language of the
amended statute reads:
IC 32-39-2-4 and IC 32-39-2-5 apply to the right of a personal
representative who is acting on behalf of the estate of a deceased person
to access: (1) the content of an electronic communication (as defined in
IC 32-39-1-6); (2) a catalogue of electronic communications (as defined
in IC 32-39-1-5); or (3) any other digital asset (as defined in IC 32-39-110); of the deceased person.
Id.
121
See § 29-1-13-1.1(b) (indicating that throughout the Indiana statute, there are certain
steps required for a personal representative to take prior to gaining access to an electronically
stored document or information of the deceased); cf. Ind. S. 253 at 2–3 (Ind. 2016) (providing
that the amended statute no longer outlines the procedures a personal representative must
follow to gain access to the electronic communication or the digital assets). In the amended
statute, access is allowed to the personal representative “who is acting on behalf” of the
deceased’s estate, with no particular extra steps needed before access is granted. Ind. S. 253
at 2–3.
122
See infra Part III.A (urging that through contract law, it can be determined that social
media access by a personal representative will be in violation of the law and the contract
created).
123
See infra Part III.B (finding that to effectively comply with the contract, both common
law and federal law must be implemented in tangent with the state statute to prohibit access
to the personal representative).
124
See § 29-1-13-1.1 (showing that there is no definition of stored electronic
communications that are applicable under this statute); see also Digital Trends Staff, The
History of Social Networking, DIGITAL TRENDS (May 14, 2016), http://www.digital
trends.com/features/the-history-of-social-networking/ [https://perma.cc/UV2H-GRH7]
(providing that social media began in 1997 with the site SixDegrees.com, but it was not until
2002 that social media truly took off and became what it is today with Friendster); cf. Ind. S.
253 at 2–3 (distinguishing that Indiana has proposed a definition to allow digital assets to
include social media according to Indiana Code § 32-39-1-10).
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access to the deceased’s social media accounts.125 The Indiana statute
currently, but incorrectly, permits access to social media accounts without
consideration to the contract that created the electronically stored
information or documents.126 To remedy this issue, the statute must be
amended to exclude any language that allows for any access by the
personal representative.127 First, Part III.A analyzes why Indiana common
law and contract law governs the current Indiana law to gain access to
electronically stored information and documents. 128 Then, Part III.B
explains why under the applicable federal and state law, the current

125
See supra Part II.C (focusing that the law and its scholars have not come to a consensus
as to a definition for digital assets or a category for digital assets, and because of the
proceeding two, whether or not digital assets are inheritable based on Indiana law); see also
§ 29-1-13-1.1 (outlining the statute at issue within this Note that allows for a personal
representative to be allowed access if approved by the custodian after providing the correct
information). To gain access to a social media account as the law stands today, a personal
representative of a deceased’s estate must have correct documentation from the court stating
that the representative may be allowed access and a death certificate of the account holder.
§ 29-1-13-1.1. Once the personal representative has the correct documentation, then the
individual may contact the social media site to request access to the account of the deceased.
Id. This is the process directed by the statute, but a social media site in another state may not
have to adhere to this standard because of jurisdictional issues. However, this is not a route
that will be discussed in this Note. The statute reads:
A custodian shall provide to the personal representative of the estate of
a deceased person, who was domiciled in Indiana at the time of the
person’s death, access to or copies of any documents or information of
the deceased person stored electronically by the custodian upon receipt
by the custodian of: (1) a written request for access or copies made by
the personal representative, accompanied by a copy of the death
certificate and a certified copy of the personal representative’s letters
testamentary; or (2) an order of a court having probate jurisdiction of
the deceased person’s estate.
Id.
126
See supra Part II.C (clarifying that the Indiana statute for electronically stored
documents or information does not define specifically what is meant by electronically stored
information, which allows for a wide range of interpretations).
127
See infra Part IV (rendering that social media is created through a contract between two
people for a limited time, a service that is only to last for the lifetime of the profile holder,
and that the statute should be amended to exclude access because of the contractual makeup
of the social media account); see also Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 837–38
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (establishing that social media is created through an adhesion contract that
takes the form of a click-wrap agreement, browse-wrap agreement, or a combination of both
agreements to bind the user to the terms of condition or service for the particular social media
site).
128
See infra Part III.A (discussing social media accounts as contracts of adhesion which can
be labeled as a cross of click-wrap and browse-wrap agreements, and how the contractual
formation should disallow the access to the personal representative).
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Indiana statute allowing access to the personal representative is
unlawful.129
A. Contract Law Governs to Exclude Access under the Indiana Statute
Unlike traditional contracts, social media contracts are not
inheritable.130 A social media contract is limited to the time the user is on
the social media service or until the user dies.131 Social media contracts
are valid, enforceable contracts upon clicking “I agree” on the social media
site because the formation is like a click-wrap or browse-wrap
agreement.132 As such, these contracts are made between two parties and
are not to be inherited once the social media user is deceased.133 Social
media contracts are click-wrap agreements because the contract requires
the user to click “I agree” before proceeding with the setup of the profile
or account.134 However, social media contracts do not follow every
element of a true click-wrap agreement.135 For example, social media sites
do not list their Terms of Use or service on the same page where the
agreement button is located.136 The Terms of Use or service are usually on
another webpage accessible through a hyperlink near the agreement
See infra Part III.B (addressing that the current state of the statute, which defines social
media as a digital asset, an electronically stored information or document, does not comply
with federal and state law that governs the contract and the ability to access that contract).
130
See Nelson v. La Tourrette, 178 N.E.2d 67, 68 (1961) (providing that a contract for a
service terminated at the death of one of the parties to the contract). While the contract in
Nelson was for a delivery service, a comparison may be drawn, because the service was not
for an essential service, rather one for convenience. Id. Like the contract in Nelson, social
media is not an essential service. Id.
131
See supra Part II.B (concluding the contract of adhesion for social media will terminate
after the death of the user who contracted for the service, such as Facebook).
132
See Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 837 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (detailing that once
a user clicks “I agree” there is a binding contract between the user and the social media site,
and courts routinely uphold adhesion contracts as valid and not unconscionable).
133
See Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc., 987 N.E.2d 604, 614 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013) (establishing that
even when a personal representative had a part in creating the contract to the digital asset,
here an email account, access to that email account after the sole user’s death was not allowed
by the court).
134
See Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 835 (stating that the assenting Facebook user must click
“Sign Up” to agree to the terms Facebook provides, but are not provided the Terms of Service
directly on the page). Facebook provides the Terms of Use on another page that is
hyperlinked on the agreement page, which a new user can click to review before agreeing,
but it is not required. Id.
135
See id. (expressing that Facebook is a combination of the two agreements, click-wrap
and browse-wrap, and thus, form a valid adhesion contract that is not unconscionable
because the user has the ability to go to another social media site to get the same service).
136
See id. (detailing the particular way social media creates a binding contract through the
contract of adhesion and the agreements within this type of contract). The Terms of Use of
Facebook are hyperlinked to a different page on Facebook’s website. Id.
129
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button, which must be clicked to agree to the contract for the social media
site.137 The social media site assumes a new user will click the hyperlink
to the Terms of Use or service before clicking agree, but that is not what
everyone does.138 Many times the individual clicks the agreement button
without reading the terms.139 However, failing to read the terms does not
make the contract between the two parties null and void; rather, the
agreement button is the digital signature and thus, binding. 140
Moreover, Facebook does not follow the true legal definition of a clickwrap agreement; however, this fact does not take away the legal
significance it provides for the social media site and the user.141 What sets
Facebook’s agreement apart and allows it to be considered a partial clickwrap agreement is that the social media site provides the Terms of Use in
a link near or below the “Click to Agree” button.142 Creating a link to the
Terms of Use is Facebook applying another form of contracting on the
Internet, the browse-wrap agreement.143

137
See Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 837 (describing the location of the hyperlink in relation to
the agree button to ensure the combination of the click-wrap and browse-wrap agreements
will be held valid). The hyperlink would provide proper notice to the user of the Terms of
Use or Service that must be agreed to before using, as well as what terms the user will be
held to when using the social media site for its social networking capabilities. Id.
138
See id. (placing that where the terms of conditions are located provides adequate notice
to the user, and whether the user actually reads the hyperlinked terms does not negate the
validity of the contract).
139
See id. (clicking agree without reading does not invalidate the agreement or the
adhesion contract for the contracted service).
140
See id. (accepting the terms by clicking agree means the terms of the contract have been
accepted by the new user). The Terms of Service for Facebook can be accessed anytime once
a user signs up for the social media service, even if the user does not read the terms prior to
signing up with the social media site. Id.
141
See Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 837 (establishing that Facebook in particular does not form
the traditional click-wrap or browse-wrap agreement, but that does not take away from the
validity and enforceability); see also Banta, supra note 7, at 823 (drawing that many states are
viewing social media contracts as a form of a digital asset and as personal property, which
has a right to be inherited). In fact, social media account contracts are some of the first
contracts to prohibit transfer of the personal property, rather than to promote social media
as a form of personal property which can be transferred to another owner. Banta, supra note
7, at 823.
142
See Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 837 (marking the unique set up of Facebook’s agreement
with its users is a combination of both click-wrap and browse-wrap agreements and is
binding to hold the users to the terms within the agreement); see also FACEBOOK, supra note
32 (focusing on the terms that are linked on Facebook’s website and are available anytime a
user wishes to re-read and re-learn the terms he or she had previously agreed to when
signing up for Facebook).
143
See Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 837 (demonstrating the way Facebook uses its Terms of
Service to bind its users through the placement in a link to the corresponding Terms of
Service page). This process Facebook uses is correct and binds its users to its terms even
though the users may not fully read the terms before clicking “I agree” to proceed through
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Social media accounts are contracts, like the contract in Schlobohm, and
are standardized contracts drafted by the networking site wanting to
impose the contract on the other party. 144 Social media sites, like
Facebook, allow the potential new user wanting the service to either
accept or reject the contract; this is referred to as a take it or leave it
contract.145 If the potential new user rejects the Terms of Use, the potential
new user chooses not to participate in the social networking site. 146
However, with social media accounts created through contracts of
adhesion, challenges arise because of the formation of the contract, such
as unconscionability.147
The limitations that social media contracts place on the new user may
seem harsh, limiting, or even unconscionable. 148 The Terms of Use of the
social media site are not too unjust or unreasonable to create substantive
unconscionability because the terms are the same terms and conditions
that every member must agree to before registering for the service.149 For
the social media contract to be procedurally unconscionable, first the user
would have to show that the agreement outlined in the Terms of Use of
the setup process. See also FACEBOOK, supra note 32 (providing the exact terms that the user
agrees to when signing up for Facebook).
144
See Schlobohm v. Spa Petite, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 920, 925–26 (Minn. 1982) (cautioning that
there is no bargaining in social media contracts, with the social media site holding the power
over the new potential user, the weaker party). The gym membership in Schlobohm was a
valid contract of adhesion with no disparity of bargaining power, and the gym membership
was not an essential service for the public. Id. See also Tender Loving Care Mgmt., Inc. v.
Sherls, 14 N.E.3d 67, 74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (following the definition of an adhesion contract
based on the decision in Sandford v. Castleton Heath Care Center, LLC); Sandford v.
Castleton Health Care Ctr., LLC, 813 N.E.2d 411, 417 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (determining that
a contract of adhesion is valid so long as it is not unconscionable).
145
See, e.g., Schlobohm, 326 N.W.2d at 925 (stating that the gym membership was a contract
of adhesion because it was a take it or leave it contract where the potential member either
signs and accepts the terms or does not sign the contract, leaving that individual to find
another gym); see also Sandford, 813 N.E.2d at 417 (expressing that the nursing home contract
was a take it or leave it contract, leaving the client’s family to find another suitable nursing
home if the family chose to do so).
146
See Schlobohm, 326 N.W.2d at 926 (finding that the contract was for a non-essential
service and was seen by the court as a take it or leave it contract).
147
See id. at 924–25 (introducing the challenges that may arise through the contract of
adhesion social media contracts are created from).
148
See Bradberry v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. C06-6567 CW, 2007 WL 1241936, at *4 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 27, 2007) (detailing that for an adhesion contract to be unconscionable, the contract
requires procedural, in the negotiation of the contract, and substantive, in the terms of the
contract itself, unconscionability).
149
See id. (directing that for a contract to be unconscionable, there must be (1) procedural
unconscionability and (2) substantive unconscionability). Both procedural and substantive
unconscionability are not required for a finding by a court that a contract of adhesion is
unconscionable. Id. Rather, unconscionability is found on a sliding scale between procedural
and substantive unconscionability. Id.
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the social networking site were unjust and unreasonable and that it was
not freely negotiated.150 The individual user does not have to use the
service that the site provides.151 In regards to the ability to negotiate freely
between the parties, the same argument can be made to the adhesion
contract being unjust or unreasonable, that if the party does not like the
Terms of Use of the social media site, the user can freely go to another
social media site and use its service.152
Additionally, social media is not an essential service that is required
to be provided to each individual in society, proving further that social
media account contracts are conscionable.153 Social media is something
people choose to be a part of, and it is a service that can be obtained from
an alternative in a similar capacity.154 As such, social media networks are
not essential to everyone because the individual seeks them out.155 Social

150
See id. (providing how to determine if a contract of adhesion is unconscionable); see also
Dexter Axle Co. v. Baan USA, Inc., 833 N.E.2d 43, 49 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (discussing the
elements that must be found for a contract to be unconscionable, whether it is a traditionally
formed contract or a contract of adhesion); cf. Anderson v. McOskar Enters., Inc., 712 N.W.2d
796, 802 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that the contract for the gym that Anderson entered
into did not include a disparity in bargaining power, and the contract was for an unnecessary
service that was not important to be required and provided for public welfare).
151
See Schlobohm, 326 N.W.2d at 926 (stating that the gym membership was a nonnecessary service and the customer had the choice to walk away or sign the contract with the
gym for its service).
152
See id. at 924 (addressing that because the contract for the non-necessary service is a take
it or leave it contract, if a party wants to negotiate and the terms are final, then the customer
will have to go to find another gym).
153
See id. at 926 (determining that the contract for the gym membership at Spa Petite was
an adhesion contract for a non-essential service, which does not need to be subject to
regulation because the service is one that is valuable, but does not need to be provided by
the public if someone cannot afford to gain access to it); see also Anderson, 712 N.W.2d at 802
(holding that the contract between Anderson and Curves was an adhesion contract for a nonessential service, a gym membership, and that it was valid and conscionable because while
there may have been a disparity in the bargaining power on the part of Anderson, she had
an option to leave Curves and go to another gym to get the same services she could receive
at Curves). Social media can be compared to a gym membership, like in Schlobohm and
Anderson, where the Supreme Court of Minnesota found that a gym membership is not an
essential service to the public and that it is not so essential that the public should regulate it.
Anderson, 712 N.W.2d at 802.
154
See Anderson, 712 N.W.2d at 802 (stating that in both Schlobohm and Anderson, a gym
service was determined to not be an essential service that both Schlobohm and Anderson
could have obtained from another gym); see also Schlobohm, 326 N.W.2d at 926 (issuing that
the gym membership was a conscionable adhesion contract like the one in Anderson, which
modeled its decision after Schlobohm).
155
See Schlobohm, 326 N.W.2d at 925 (highlighting that essential services are services such
as: visiting doctors, hospitals, and public works or utilities). Social media is not an essential
service that must be provided to each individual to live a healthy and socially acceptable life.
Id.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol51/iss1/4

Cates: Facebooking from the Great Beyond: The Push to Amend Indiana's St

2016]

Facebook: A Digital Asset?

99

media is not so essential that the public regulates it.156 While social media
is a service desired by most individuals, it is a service with reasonable
alternatives; there is not just one social media site.157 The lack of
bargaining power on behalf of the potential new user to the social media
site may seem like the contract is being imposed on the party; that the take
it or leave it nature of the contract is too harsh for a communication
service.158 The harsh enforcement and lack of alternatives creates the
notion that the agreement is unconscionable, but the lack of exact
alternatives does not create unconscionability. 159
However, as illustrated in Anderson, social media may be an essential
service that everyone should have an opportunity to participate in, and
thereby, contracts of adhesion would be unconscionable.160 The take it or
leave it nature of social media agreements is too harsh for a service that is
essential to all people. 161 With the heavy reliance on social media today,
it can be readily seen that this view has the proper support to be true.162
But, what it lacks is the essential nature to be regulated, which is a factor
necessary to be an essential service.163 There is not a committee or public

156
See id. at 926 (comparing social media to the gym service in Schlobohm to illustrate that
while a social media service may be nice to have, it is not required for a person as a member
of society, just like a gym membership).
157
See, e.g., Anderson, 712 N.W.2d at 802 (remarking that a gym membership is a service
desired by many people, but it is not one essential to the public welfare that would lead to
an unconscionable contract of adhesion).
158
See Bradberry v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. C06-6567 CW, 2007 WL 1241936, at *4 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 27, 2007) (exacting that there are certain aspects of the contract that may be
considered unreasonable because they are being imposed on the user, and this imposing
nature will result in the contract of adhesion being unconscionable); see also Weaver v. Am.
Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144, 146 (1971) (providing an illustration of an unconscionable adhesion
contract, one that is not for social media service, but is a valid example of how to determine
if the social media contract is unconscionable based on the imposing nature of the contract).
159
See Schlobohm, 326 N.W.2d at 926 (illustrating that bargaining power and the disparity
in the bargaining power may create unconscionability, but there needs to be more).
160
See Anderson, 712 N.W.2d at 802 (examining that social media is not a service that must
be provided and the lack of exact alternatives is acceptable because it is not an essential
service through showing examples, which are essential services).
161
But see id. (finding that Anderson did not present to the court any evidence that would
lead the court to find that there was disparity in bargaining power).
162
But see Schlobohm, 326 N.W.2d at 926 (determining that some people may find that social
media may be an essential service because it provides a way to communicate with people
and that may be the only way to communicate with some friends or family who do not live
near them).
163
See id. (regulating a service is a required factor in determining that a service is in fact an
essential service).
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official that regulates what is posted on these social media sites.164 The
social media site regulates what is posted on the site itself.165
Pictures and posts on social media are not the personal, intangible
property of the user.166 Because social media is not something that has
present or future value or is moveable at the time of sale or contracting, it
is not personal property.167 Social media also has no monetary value to
associate or label with it.168 Because social media does not have any
present or future tangible value, and value cannot be interpreted through
emotional or sentimental value, it cannot be classified as personal
property.169 To the everyday social media user, there is no tangible value
in the pictures, posts, or tweets released on social media by the user. 170
Not only is tangible value important to personal property, for social media
to be considered personal property, there must be rights within the
contract that allow the account holder to take ownership.171 The personal,
164
See id. (taking that for a service to be essential it must be regulated, and social media is
not regulated like public works, thus proving it is not essential).
165
See id. (indicating that contracts that are for the public good have the ability to be
regulated by an outside source, but social media does not fall within this category because
social media is a not a contracted service that is for the public good or a necessity); see also
Anderson, 712 N.W.2d at 802 (inferring that regulating is not done by an outside source, but
by the social media site itself through the terms and conditions the user agrees to prior to
using the social media service).
166
See Low v. LinkedIn Corp., 900 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1028 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (providing that
browse history of a social media site, LinkedIn, was not the personal property of the user).
The inference can be made that if the browse history is not the personal property of the user,
then the social media site profile of the user is not the personal property of the user. Id.
167
See IND. CODE § 32-17-14-3(11) (2016) (providing the definition of the term property).
The direct language from the statute states “[p]roperty means any present or future interest
in real property, intangible personal property, or tangible personal property. The term
includes . . . (C) a right to receive performance remaining due under a contract . . . .” Id. See
also Lowrance v. Lowrance, 182 N.E. 273, 277 (Ind. Ct. App. 1932) (defining personal property
as “property of a personal or movable nature as opposed to property of a local or immovable
character”).
168
See Meek v. State, 185 N.E. 899, 901 (Ind. 1933) (verifying that for an object or item to be
personal property, there must be some monetary value to the item, and social media for the
everyday individual does not have monetary value).
169
See id. (determining that value cannot be the emotional value, such as the pictures and
posts on Facebook or any other social media site; the value must be monetary and calculable).
170
See § 32-17-14-3(11) (defining personal property, and among the types listed in the
statute, social media cannot fall into any of those categories to be considered personal
property). The actual language of the statute defining personal property indicates
“[i]ntangible personal property means incorporeal property, such as money, deposits,
credits, shares of stock, bonds, notes, other evidences of indebtedness, and other evidences
of property interests.” Id.
171
See Meek, 185 N.E. at 901 (finding that where there is control over an inanimate object,
there is a property right in the object); see also Browning v. Walters, 616 N.E.2d 1040, 1047
(Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that personal property includes the owner’s rights in the
property, as well as the value).
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emotional value in the pictures, posts, and tweets to the individual social
media user would make the argument difficult.172 Personal, emotional
value does not create a property right that is statutorily needed to create a
property right.173 The idea is hard to sell because personal property is not
statutorily defined using emotion, even though property can often be
more than just physical.174
Nevertheless, a valid contract can be considered the personal property
of the parties to the contract, but this is not the case for social media
account contracts.175 Under this rationale, each post, picture, or tweet
from social media should be protected by the contract and considered
personal property.176 A valid adhesion contract makes everything posted
the personal property of the user, because the subject matter of the
contract is regarded as personal property.177 Defining contracts, as subject
matter to personal property, would lead to social media accounts being
inheritable once the account holder dies.178 The Indiana statute, under this

172
See Meek, 185 N.E. at 901 (stating that the definition of personal property does not
include the emotional value of pictures or posts that could be saved to someone’s computer
if they choose to do so); see also § 32-17-14-3(11) (providing the statutory definition as to what
constitutes personal property of an individual in Indiana).
173
See Meek, 185 N.E. at 901 (reiterating that value is found in the property itself, not in the
value the owner gives the object or piece of property).
174
See § 32-17-14-3(11) (providing the statutory definition of personal property and
intangible property to understand that contracts may fit within the definition but it takes a
particular contract to do so, one that is for a tangible item); see, e.g., Dept. of Fin. Insts. v. Holt,
108 N.E.2d 629, 634 (Ind. 1952) (finding that property is more than the physical objects people
own, which includes valid contracts).
175
See Meek, 185 N.E. at 901 (inferring the possibility that a contract may be personal
property); see also Wolf v. Wolf, 259 N.E.2d 89, 91 (Ind. Ct. App. 1970) (asserting that a
contract is personal property when it is used as the subject to a property relationship); Nelson
v. La Tourrette, 178 N.E.2d 67, 68 (Ind. Ct. App. 1961) (holding that a contract is only a form
of property when it is an item as a subject to a personal property relationship).
176
See, e.g., Wolf, 259 N.E.2d at 91 (considering that the Terms of Use of a social media site
include the pictures and posts of the user, so the pictures and posts would be considered
property).
177
See supra Part II.B (examining the possibility that the adhesion contract created through
signing up for social media may create a property right in itself); see also Wolf, 259 N.E.2d at
92 (validating the contract allows all the posts, pictures, or verbal language to be considered
personal property of the user because the terms and conditions of the social media site
regulate the posts and pictures, which are permitted to be posted on the social media site).
178
See Meek, 185 N.E. at 901 (concluding that there are certain ways in which the contract
of an individual may be the personal property of the parties to the contract); but see Low v.
LinkedIn Corp., 900 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1018 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (differentiating that the browse
history for a social media site was not the personal property of the user).
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idea, would be effective in allowing social media accounts to be accessed
by a personal representative of the deceased.179
Contracts do not create a property right in themselves because the
social media account does not have a property right in the contract, which
leads to the social media account not being the personal property of the
deceased.180 However, personal property is established through contracts
by making the contract the subject matter to the personal property.181
Using this interpretation, social media accounts could be considered
personal property of the user or owner. 182 The user enters into a contract
for social networking purposes, and when the profile descends or is
inherited by an heir, it is the account the heir is inheriting, not the contract
for the account.183 According to Wolf, social media accounts could be
considered personal property of the user and owner of the account, which
would allow the owner to pass the account to a future heir, but this is not
the correct view.184 Social media is not defined as personal property or as
a contract.185 However, it has yet to be determined if personal property is
the appropriate category for social media, a subset of digital assets, which
179
See, e.g., § 29-1-13-1.1 (establishing what the statute currently states in regards to
inheriting and the personal representative gaining access to digital assets after an account
holder’s death).
180
See Low, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1029 (conceding that a contract does not by itself create a
valuable right in itself that would allow for the contract to be considered personal property);
see also Wolf, 259 N.E.2d at 91 (presenting that social media is a contract that does not create
a property right in itself).
181
See § 29-1-13-13 (considering how to make a contract the personal property of the
contracted parties, and if one party dies, how the contract can be passed to the personal
representative to fulfill the contract); see, e.g., Wolf, 259 N.E.2d 91–92 (observing that a
contract can have property rights in it by making the contract the term to a property right).
182
See supra Part II.B (detailing that there are two options on how to view social media, as
a contract or as a personal property interest); see also Wolf, 259 N.E.2d at 91–92 (inferring that
through seeing a social media contract as property, it is by making the contract itself the term
of the property, the social media profile becomes the property of the user; everything posted
on the profile would, too, become the property of the owner).
183
See Meek, 185 N.E. at 901 (drawing the counterview to this Note, which would make
social media an item of personal property that is descendible); see also Wolf, 259 N.E.2d at 92
(noting that the contract entered by the individual for the social media service should be
considered the subject matter to define the personal property, the profile and everything
posted or said on the social media profile).
184
See Wolf, 259 N.E.2d at 92 (modeling social media contracts as property by using the
contracts for bonds to be the model and guide). This is the favored view of social media as
personal property. It is through this view that allowing a personal representative to access
the accounts after the user’s death would not conflict with the common law of the state.
185
See § 29-1-13-1.1 (validating that there is no definition that applies to digital assets
within the statute that would indicate social media’s status as a contract or as the personal
property of the user). Once again, this statute has current legislation that amends and
provides a definition of digital assets to the current language to define electronically stored
information. Id.
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many scholars today define social media as, and allows for access.186 The
Indiana statute, Section 29-1-13-1.1, improperly allows personal
representatives to access social media, which does not comply with
federal and state law.187
B. Federal and State Law
Social media’s purpose is for the living generation to communicate
freely with the user’s friends and family, both near and far, not for a
personal representative to access and keep up as his or her own.188 By
requiring agreement to the terms before proceeding onto the social media
site, Facebook creates a contract between itself and the new user before
the user can use the social media service.189 Although the deceased’s
contract can occasionally be fulfilled by a personal representative if the
service or purpose of the contract has yet to be fully satisfied, this is not
possible with social media contracts.190 Here, the contract violated by a
third party is a contract of adhesion. 191 Fundamentally, contracts of
adhesion are different in nature than those of traditionally conceived
contracts, because contracts of adhesion force the user to agree to the terms
of the site, which is exactly what social media has done.192 For instance,
Facebook has terms in its service agreement prohibiting the user from
186
See Pinch, supra note 14, at 547 (providing that the status of digital assets as property is
unknown and undefined). While many scholars have taken the route in deciding that social
media is the personal property of the user, there has been little to substantiate that definition.
Id.
187
See § 29-1-13-1.1 (expressing that if the appropriate federal and state law was applied to
the statute, access to personal representatives to social media accounts of the deceased user
would not be allowed, and the contract would terminate at the death of the user).
188
See supra Part II.A (detailing the purpose of social media, that it is for those who are
alive to communicate and keep in contact with loved ones, both near and far, and to connect
with people they may not have had a chance to communicate with across the world).
189
See Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 837–38 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (confirming that
social media is a contract, how the contract is formed, and what type of contract it is); see also
Zaltz v. JDate, 952 F. Supp. 2d 439, 452 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (qualifying that the contract must be
agreed upon and how to agree to the contract).
190
See § 29-1-13-13 (identifying that there is a way for contracts to be taken over by the
personal representative and what these types of contracts are for).
191
See Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 835 (applying that Facebook creates a contract of adhesion
through combining two different forms of Internet adhesion contracts, click-wrap and
browse-wrap, to create the binding agreement for the social media site). It is through the
Terms of Service agreement for Facebook that the user must agree to, which creates the
adhesion contract that binds the user to Facebook. Id.
192
See Schlobohm v. Spa Petite, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 920, 924 (Minn. 1982) (reiterating that
social media contracts are not traditionally formed with elements of offer, acceptance, and
consideration). Social media is created through a contract like the one in Schlobohm for a gym
service. Id. While the service being contracted for is different, the lack of ability to bargain
is the foundation for both contracts. Id.
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allowing another individual to transfer the account to anyone else to
monitor and post from without Facebook’s explicit consent.193
The Terms of Service is “dead hand control” over the social media site,
maintaining the user’s wishes to be the sole user of the account with the
right to post pictures or statuses based on the agreement to the Terms of
Service.194 Dead hand control goes to the foundation on which our
probate system is based and furthers the understanding for social media
contracts’ control over the account of a deceased user.195 If the deceased
does not leave instructions with his or her permission to access the social
media account after his or her death, the Terms of Service should be dead
hand control over the social media site because it was a term agreed to by
the deceased user.196 No one, including the personal representative,
should be allowed access to the social media profile on the basis that the
Terms of Service govern and disallow the personal representative access
to the account.197 Facebook, and other social media sites, is in the business
of providing a platform for communication among the living generation;
it is not an ancestry site.198
Like traditional contracts, social media accounts create a contractual
relationship between the user and the social media site, but unlike
traditional contracts, social media contracts impose the Terms of Use on
the party seeking the service.199 Terms of adhesion contracts tend to favor
See FACEBOOK, supra note 32 (pointing out a term within the Facebook Terms of Use
prohibiting the user from transferring the profile to another without explicit consent from
Facebook).
194
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 16, at 1 (applying a traditional probate term and
rule to a modern issue that would allow the social media site to prevent the personal
representative from accessing the profile). With this rule, the social media account belonging
to a deceased user will cease after the user dies, unless the user has in place a legacy user
prior to death. Id.
195
See id. (reiterating that this is a foundational term and school of thought that is
constantly upheld by courts and academics alike because it is fundamental to the succession
of deceased estates).
196
See id. (pointing out the need to fulfill the wishes of the deceased should always be at
the forefront of society’s decisions).
197
See Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act § 8(b), UNIF. LAW COMM’N (2014),
http://www.uniformlaws.org1/shared/docs/Fiduciary%20Access%C20to%C20Digital%
Ässets/2014_UFADAA_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XY9-CLLC] (providing that access to
the deceased user’s account should be prohibited to anyone who was not given access by the
deceased). Access should be denied based on the federal and state common law that governs
personal representative access to social media account contracts. Id.
198
See Smith, supra note 27 (following that social media sites and accounts are for the living
generation for communication, and allowing access to a personal representative goes against
what Facebook is in the business of providing to its users).
199
See Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 835 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (reviewing the way
that social media contracts are formed, through the adhesion contract, and how this type of
contract is similar and different from traditionally formed contracts); see also Ajemian v.
193
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the social media site, which imposes the terms on the weaker party, the
new user.200 Each social media site has its own Terms of Service or use,
and the terms are imposed on a new user, which then forms an adhesion
contract.201
Fteja affirms that social media contracts create a contract of
adhesion.202 It is within the terms of the social media site that outline what
a user can or cannot do with the account.203 The Facebook Terms of
Service detail the user is the only individual who is authorized to use the
account and no one else should be given access to the individual’s
account.204 The terms also state an account will not be transferred to
another individual, unless Facebook gives explicit permission to the
account holder, not a third party.205 Facebook’s Terms of Service are
binding on the personal representative because of the power the
UFADAA gives to the Terms of Service of each social media site.206 Section
Yahoo!, Inc., 987 N.E.2d 604, 614 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013) (concluding that Internet transactions,
such as signing up for a Facebook account, which although may be a new variation on
contracting, it is in fact still a contractual relationship between the user and Facebook.);
Bradberry v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. C06-6567CW, 2007 WL 1241936, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr.
27, 2007) (defining a contract of adhesion in a cellphone plan as a take it or leave it contract
with only the opportunity to accept or reject the contract); FACEBOOK, supra note 32 (detailing
the social media contract for Facebook and the Terms of Use that the site imposes on the new
user);.
200
See Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 835 (showing that the terms of conditions for Facebook are
imposed upon the new user, and the new user does not have an opportunity to negotiate the
terms because they are the same terms each user must agree to before using Facebook).
201
See, e.g., TWITTER, supra note 32 (outlining the Terms of Service for potential Twitter
users); cf. FACEBOOK, supra note 32 (canvasing the terms to use Facebook and post on the site,
which each new user must agree to before using the social media site); INSTAGRAM, supra
note 32 (setting out the Terms of Use when signing up to Instagram).
202
See Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 835 (inferring that with the terms being provided to the user
and not allowing the user to negotiate the terms of the contract forms a contract of adhesion
that favors Facebook in its creation because the terms must simply be agreed to prior to using
the social media site).
203
See, e.g., TWITTER, supra note 32 (outlining the terms for potential Twitter users that each
must abide by); cf. FACEBOOK, supra note 32 (issuing the Terms of Use for Facebook which
each new user must agree to before using the social media site); INSTAGRAM, supra note 32
(setting out the Terms of Use when signing up to use the site).
204
See, e.g., FACEBOOK, supra note 32 (determining that an individual user is the only one
who is able to access the account). The particular term states that, “[y]ou will not share your
password . . . , let anyone else access your account, or do anything else that might jeopardize
the security of your account.” Id.
205
See, e.g., id. (detailing that the individual user is the only one who is able to contact
Facebook to request someone else be able to access the Facebook account). The exact term of
the Facebook Terms of Service that applies is, “[y]ou will not transfer your account . . . to
anyone without first getting our [Facebook’s] written permission.” Id.
206
See Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act § 8, UNIF. LAW COMM’N (2014),
http://www.uniformlaws.org1/shared/docs/Fiduciary%20Access%C20to%C20Digital%
Ässets/2014_UFADAA_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XY9-CLLC] (supplying that the
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eight of the UFADAA gives the social media site the ability to govern over
the fiduciary’s ability to access the digital asset, which would be social
media, or not allow access based on the Terms of Service of the particular
social media site.207 The power this section gives to the social media site
in creating its Terms of Service to ensure the social media site has the
ability to determine if the personal representative of the deceased is
allowed access is exponential.208 Providing the social media site the power
to decide prevents a parent from gaining access to his or her son’s or
daughter’s Facebook profile and continuing to post pictures or statuses
after the child’s death.209
In the Indiana Code section 29-1-13-1.1, social media is incorrectly
classified as electronically stored information and documents.210 Not
allowing the personal representative to access the electronically stored
document(s) or information of the account holder after his or her death is
imperative to respecting both federal and common law.211 Allowing the
personal representative to access the account is a violation of the user’s
privacy.212 While there is a system to ensure the personal representative
does his or her duties, the system does not check to ensure the personal
representative does not take on the identity of the deceased on social
media.213 Furthermore, allowing the personal representative access is a

UFADAA will govern to allow the Terms of Service of the social media site to limit the
fiduciary’s access to the deceased’s social media profile).
207
See id. (providing the section that explicitly states what the social media Terms of Use
and other law will limit the fiduciary’s access to social media and other digital assets).
208
See id. (noting the power the UFADAA gives to the social media sites to limit the
fiduciary in gaining access to the social media profile).
209
See id. (providing an example of why it is important to limit the access to a deceased
individual’s social media account). While the UFADAA does not explicitly say access should
be denied, it relies on the Terms of Service or use of the social media account to determine
how to gain access and who must agree to allow access to the social media site. Id.
210
See IND. CODE § 29-1-13-1.1 (2016) (highlighting the terms used within the Indiana
statute that currently allow social media to be accessed by the personal representative).
211
See supra Part II.C (detailing the issues that may arise out of the legislation and law that
currently allows a personal representative the ability to request access to the social media
account of the deceased individual).
212
See Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act § 8, UNIF. LAW COMM’N (2014),
http://www.uniformlaws.org1/shared/docs/Fiduciary%20Access%C20to%C20Digital%
Ässets/2014_UFADAA_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XY9-CLLC] (endorsing that the
UFADAA argues to further the privacy of the social media account holder and the social
media parent site by relying on the Terms of Service as a contract that the user agrees).
213
See supra Part II.A (reiterating the hazards of allowing a third party to access the
information of a contract when the Terms of Use the deceased user agreed upon when
signing up for the social media service did not allow it); see also Uniform Fiduciary Access to
Digital Assets Act § 4 (providing that the UFADAA points to the Terms of Service of the
social media site to alleviate the potential violation of an unverified third party from
accessing the social media profile of a deceased user).
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form of identity theft and a breach of the contract.214 By allowing access,
the law is disregarding the privacy of the user, which is essential to the
formation of the social media contract. 215 Additionally, access to social
media sites provides extra challenges to the social media parent site to
ensure personal representatives are not abusing their access privileges
and the access does not correctly promote respecting human dignity and
the finality of death of a social media user.216
Where the language of the statute is clear, it gives too much power to
the personal representative to gain access.217 While a situation where the
personal representative takes on the account and operates it as his or her
own may be unlikely, it should not be disregarded as a possibility. 218 The
current Indiana statute makes this outcome possible; therefore, the statute
needs to be amended to prevent access by a personal representative to
social media sites of the deceased user.219
IV. CONTRIBUTION
Defining social media as a contractual relationship, void of property
rights, would bring the Indiana statute, Indiana Code section 29-1-13-1.1,
current with terms of social media contracts themselves.220 Social media
contracts prohibit someone other than the account holder from requesting
access to the social media account or any documents or information stored

214
See supra Part II.C (admitting the potential pitfalls of the Indiana statute allowing a third
party the ability to access a deceased’s social media).
215
See Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act § 8 (examining that the Terms of
Service are essential to the understanding of how a third party may lawfully gain access to
the social media account); see also Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 837–38 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (acknowledging that the social media contract is a contract of adhesion created through
the combination of click-wrap and browse-wrap agreements).
216
See supra Part II.C (lending an understanding of Indiana law and the relevant federal
law that lends to the lack of understanding for what a digital asset is and how it is to be
handled after the user dies).
217
See IND. CODE § 29-1-13-1.1 (2016) (judging that the current language of the statute gives
the ability of too much access to the third party if the personal representative follows the
instructions provided in the current statute).
218
See A. Smith, supra note 2 (expressing that a third party gaining access to a deceased
user’s account is possible and the third party did take on using the Facebook profile as her
own when it belonged to her deceased daughter).
219
See infra Part IV (asserting that the current statute should be amended to exclude access
to the personal representatives of the deceased user’s estate, which would lead to the contract
created being respected).
220
See supra Part III.B (arguing that the proposed amendment outlined in Part IV would
provide a clear understanding to the Indiana statute and exclude access to electronically
stored information and documents by the personal representative).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2016

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 51, No. 1 [2016], Art. 4

108

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

on the social media site.221 By not defining social media accounts as digital
assets that apply to the category of electronically stored documents or
information, the Indiana statute will correctly apply fundamental
principles of contract law, as well as follow what the Terms of Use of the
social media site set out.222 The current confusion, leading to the improper
use of the statute, exists because the statute does not define the term
“electronically stored documents or information,” and as such, the term is
ambiguous and open to rogue interpretation.223 Therefore, the Indiana
legislature must amend the statute to exclude access to electronically
stored documents or information to the personal representative of the
deceased’s estate.224 To begin, Part IV.A proposes an amendment to
remove any part of the statute that allows access in violation of contract
Then, Part IV.B provides commentary on the proposed
law.225
amendment and responds to anticipated counterarguments.226
A. Proposed Amendment
The Indiana Congress should codify the following proposed statute:
Ind. Code § 29-1-13-1.1 Electronically stored documents
or information defined; custodians; providing access or
copies to personal representatives
(a) As used in this section, “custodian” means any
person who electronically stores the documents or
information of another person.
(b) A custodian shall provide to the personal
representative of the estate of a deceased person, who
was domiciled in Indiana at the time of the person’s
death, access to or copies of any documents or

221
See, e.g., FACEBOOK, supra note 32 (exploring the power the Terms of Use or Service of a
social media site gives to the deceased).
222
See supra Part III.A (supporting that social media is created through a contract between
two parties, not to be interfered by a third party, when the social media Terms of Use do not
permit this interference, unless it has been requested by the account holder in particular).
223
See supra Part III (excluding access to the personal representative is needed to bring the
statute to a place where it would be able to be applied to case law, if needed).
224
See infra Part IV.A (proposing an amendment to IND. CODE § 29-1-13-1.1, which would
exclude access of the personal representative of the deceased’s estate to the user’s
electronically stored information and documents).
225
See infra Part IV.A (providing detail about the proposed amendment to IND. CODE § 291-13-1.1).
226
See infra Part IV.B (giving the commentary to the proposed amendment, as well as the
critic’s views on the proposed amendment to IND. CODE § 29-1-13-1.1).
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information of the deceased person stored electronically
by the custodian upon receipt by the custodian of:
(1) a written request for access or copies made by the
personal representative, accompanied by a copy of
the death certificate and a certified copy of the
personal representative’s letters testamentary; or
(2) an order of a court having probate jurisdiction of
the deceased person’s estate.
(c) A custodian may not destroy or dispose of the
electronically stored documents or information of the
deceased person for two (2) years after the custodian
receives a request or order under subsection (c).
(d) Nothing in this section shall be construed to require a
custodian to disclose any information:
(1) in violation of any applicable federal law; or
(2) to which the deceased person would not have
been permitted in the ordinary court of business by
the custodian.227
B. Commentary
The proposed amendment prevents access to social media, which
currently allows anything stored electronically or online to be accessed by
a personal representative of a deceased social media user’s estate.228 By
removing access to the personal representative in the statute, the personal
representative would be denied access that is currently allowed under the
statute.229 First, the amendment removes the ability of the personal
representative to petition for access to a social media account. 230 By
removing access to social media accounts, the amendment allows the
contract between the deceased user and the social media site to be

This Note proposes an amendment to IND. CODE § 29-1-13-1.1 prior to the amended
language effective July 1, 2016. The normal font is the language of the original statute. The
language with a strike through is the language the author wishes to strike from the original
statute.
228
See infra Part IV.B (indicating the potential hole in the statute, which would be the lack
of a full explanation of electronically stored information or documents, and lack of certainty
which digital assets apply to this definition within this statute).
229
See supra Part IV.A (introducing an amendment to exclude access to electronically
stored documents and information by the personal representative of the deceased user’s
estate, as IND. CODE § 29-1-13-1.1 currently allows the personal representative to do just that).
230
See supra Part IV.A (giving the advantage of amending the statute to remove the ability
to petition for access to the social media account of the deceased user).
227

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2016

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 51, No. 1 [2016], Art. 4

110

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

respected.231 Second, the amendment gives the social media platform the
ability to continue to enforce its terms after the user’s death.232
Amending section 29-1-13-1.1 will provide a clearer understanding of
the statute in regards to contract law and how the statute should be
applied.233 The statute is currently not being used or applied because
practitioners and scholars are unable to understand its proper application
to estate planning and which digital assets apply to the statute. The
proposed amendment would allow for a social media site, like Facebook,
to control the outcome of a user’s social media profile, unless the user has
previously stated what he or she wants to occur to his or her profile after
Additionally, the proposed amendment strengthens the
death.234
contractual relationship between the social media site and the user.235 By
not allowing a third party to access the account after the primary user’s
death, the contract between the two parties is respected and upheld to the
terms provided in the Terms of Use or Service.236 The amendment also
determines social media accounts are not inheritable or descendible
because an estate of the deceased cannot access them. 237
Critics may view the proposed amended statute as limiting social
media from being labeled or classified as personal property.238 Their
argument is likely shrouded by the idea that a social media account is
231
See supra Part IV.A (reflecting that the amendment will provide clarity to practitioners
and scholars on the subject of digital assets and social media in particular, and determining
if this class has the ability to be inherited or accessed by a personal representative).
232
See supra Part III.A (providing why the Indiana statute should not apply to social media
because social media profiles, like Facebook, are formed temporarily and do not have specific
documents that belong on the profile, which cannot be gained through other means).
233
See supra Part III (outlining that a definition of social media being considered a
contractual relationship, not personal property, would clear up the misunderstanding and
ambiguity of the current state of the Indiana statute at issue in this Note).
234
See supra Part IV.A (detailing the proposed amendment, and specifically stating the
amendment would provide that the contract created by the user and the social media site
would be controlling after the death of the user); see IND. CODE § 29-1-13-1.1 (2016)
(describing that the statute is to be used to allow a representative of the estate to contact a
custodian of the electronically stored information or documents to request access to the
deceased’s information or documents in its possession).
235
See supra Part III.B (stating social media accounts are contracts between two parties).
236
See supra Part III.A (issuing that the Terms of Use of the social media site create a
contract and terms that must be followed by the user after assent to the contract when
proceeding to create the social media profile).
237
See supra Part III.A (finding that social media accounts are not the personal property of
the account holder because the account holder does not hold any valuable interest in the
account that can be then passed on to someone after the account holder’s death).
238
See supra Part II.B (describing how personal property is defined and how it could
possibly be applied to social media, but in this Part of the Note, it is construed that social
media is not personal property); see also § 32-17-14-3(4) (determining that the personal
property definition provided by this Indiana statute does not include social media as the
personal property of an individual).
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personal property because of the videos, pictures, or words that are posted
on the social media site.239 This argument may be entertained under the
false notion that the value of these digital items, if printed or made into a
physical memento, would hold value and interest to the owner of the
physical item.240 In the digital form on the social media account, the
pictures, videos, and posts do not hold the same value. However, this
view of transforming digital assets into a physical asset that is personal
property is not correct. The form of asset being discussed is the digital
form, the social media site itself, not the form that may be created after
taking an item off of the social media site. The proposed amendment
would reiterate to individuals reading and applying the statute that there
is no value or interest in the pictures, posts, and words that are posted on
Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter.241 If the representative of the deceased
person’s estate wished to have the pictures or posts from the account, by
going to the account and printing off the pictures, that creates a different
type of asset. Printing off the pictures creates tangible, personal property
assets, which may or may not have value.
V. CONCLUSION
Under the proposed amendment to the Indiana statute, Barbara
would no longer be able to access Ashley’s Facebook and other social
media accounts. While it is difficult to deny a parent of a deceased child
access to the account, upholding the contractual relationship between
Ashley and the social media site follows with the relevant federal and state
probate law associated with digital assets. The danger with allowing
Barbara access is the social media profile or account will no longer be
239
See supra Part II.B (drawing a comparison that digital assets of videos, pictures, and
word documents available through social media may be compared and determined to be
personal property of the account holder before making them a physical asset). However,
this comparison is neither accurate nor made within this Note.
240
See supra Part II.B (arguing that social media is a contract between the user and the social
media parent site, not the personal property of the social media user); see also How Do I Save
a Photo to My Phone or Computer, supra note 93 (providing a way for a user or user’s loved one
to save the pictures on a profile without obtaining access to the social media account).
241
See supra Part IV.A (detailing the proposed amendment to the Indiana statute that
would prevent access to a personal representative of a deceased user to the user’s
electronically store information or documents); see also TWITTER, supra note 32 (outlining the
terms Twitter users must abide by); cf. FACEBOOK, supra note 32 (issuing the Terms of Use for
Facebook that each new user must agree to before using the social media site); INSTAGRAM,
supra note 32 (setting out the Terms of Use when signing up to use the site). By posting
pictures to each of these websites, the user is relinquishing some right and interest in them,
whether or not they were the personal property of the individual initially. You, the user, are
giving the public, who views your pictures, the right to look and even claim them for
themselves if they choose to do so.
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associated with the deceased user because a third party will be operating
the profile. There is no ownership in the account on behalf of the user,
Ashley, so the social media account or profile is not the personal property
of the user. The account cannot be descendible or inheritable by the
deceased’s estate.
The interest the user has in the social media account terminates at
death. Although there might be good intentions with allowing a personal
representative to access a deceased individual’s social media account, the
legal sense in doing so overrules any good intentions. Facebook, for
example, does not allow transfer of account holders by a third party; only
the original account holder may request transfer with the permission of
Facebook. Through the proposed amendment to the Indiana statute, the
contractual relationship between the two parties is respected and upheld.
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